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RESISTING FEDERAL COURTS ON
TRIBAL JURISDICTION
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER*
This Paper is part of a call for a paradigm-shifting re-
examination by Indian tribes and Indian people about their
place in the American constitutional structure. For tribal
advocates to prevail in the federal judiciary, they must force
federal judges to rethink everything they know about federal
Indian law. There are at least two ways to do this. Tribal
advocates and American Indian law scholars must first es-
tablish a baseline of knowledge and information about the
realities of Indian country in the twenty-first century. This
work is nascent and ongoing, if not burgeoning, but frankly
is far from enough. A second strategy must be a strategy it-
self, litigation with an eye toward presenting the best cases
before the federal judiciary and the Supreme Court. As any
litigator knows, facts win a case, not general truths.
In this Paper, I argue for a theory of tribal consent and resis-
tance to federal government control embodied in the Su-
preme Court's assertion of federal court supervision of tribal
court civil jurisdiction. The pure federal common law cause
of action expounded by the Supreme Court in 1985's Nation-
al Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe is ripe for re-examination, if
not outright reversal. Tribes never consented to such a
broad-based assertion of federal court jurisdiction, although
tribes could consent if asked. I propose methods by which
tribes and their appellate counsel can resist such jurisdiction
and perhaps in the same breath establish a meaningful rec-
ognition by the Supreme Court of the legitimacy of tribal jus-
tice systems.
* Associate Professor, Michigan State University College of Law; Director, Indi-
genous Law and Policy Center. Chi-miigwetch to Sarah Krakoff and Kristen Car-
penter for the invitation to present an earlier version of this Paper at the Univer-
sity of Colorado Law School, and to Addie Rolnick and Angela Riley for the
invitation to present a different version of this Paper at UCLA Law School.
Thanks to Devon Carbado, Rick Collins, Kate Fort, David Getches, Carole Gold-
berg, Jerry Kang, Melody McCoy, Wenona Singel, Kevin Washburn, and most es-
pecially to Judge William A. Fletcher for inspiration.
HeinOnline  -- 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 973 2010
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO I.AW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Assume for a moment that a federal court issues an order
enjoining an American Indian tribal court from exercising ju-
risdiction in a civil matter where the defendant is not a mem-
ber of the Indian nation because the federal court, applying
federal law, concludes that the tribal court does not have juris-
diction.1 Assume further that the tribal court, stuck with a
choice between dismissing the civil action against the non-
member or complying with tribal statutory law requiring the
court to assert jurisdiction, chooses to disregard the federal
court order.
What then? The answer is not so obvious. Can the federal
court hold the tribal court in contempt? Can the federal court
issue a writ of mandamus compelling the tribal court to dismiss
the civil action? 2 Can the federal court send in the United
States Marshal to shut down the tribal court? Would a federal
judge issue an order for the arrest of a tribal judge?
The answer is uncertain (at least from the point of view of
tribal interests) because the authority of the United States over
Indian nations is uncertain. As Robert Clinton famously dem-
onstrated, there is no supremacy clause for Indian nations.3 As
the Supreme Court has reiterated again and again, the Consti-
tution does not bind Indian nations. 4 They are separate sove-
reigns-domestic and dependent, perhaps, but still sovereigns
drawing sovereignty from a source independent from federal
and state sovereigns. 5 Moreover, except in the context of crim-
inal law, 6 Congress has not seen fit to grant federal courts
power to review tribal court determinations. If federal courts
1. This is a common occurrence. E.g., Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area v.
LaRance, No. CV-08-0474-PHX-DGC, slip op. at 23 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2009),
available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/order-ww-v-larance-d-
ariz.pdf ("Defendants [tribal court judges] are directed to vacate the judgment and
to cease any litigation concerning [plaintiff] personally.").
2. Maybe not. See Chippewa v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, No. CV-09-57-E-
BLW, slip op. at 6 (D. Idaho Nov. 9, 2009), available at
http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2009/1 1/chippewa-dct-order.pdf (asserting
that federal courts are not authorized under the All Writs Act to issue writs of
mandamus to Indian tribes).
3. Robert N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tri-
bes, 37 ARIz. ST. L.J. 113 (2002).
4. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct.
2709 (2008); see also Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
5. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006) (authorizing those convicted of crimes in tribal
courts to petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court).
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are courts of limited jurisdiction, from where does the jurisdic-
tion to determine tribal court authority derive? Most impor-
tantly, have Indian nations ever consented to federal court au-
thority over tribal justice systems?
In reality, there is almost never a need for anyone to find
the answer to the above hypothetical question. Until recent
years, tribal courts and Indian law practitioners uniformly de-
ferred to federal court orders enjoining the civil actions before
them.7 Most everyone-from tribal legislators to tribal courts
to tribal members-starts their Indian country jurisdictional
analyses with reference to what the United States Supreme
Court has held, subjugating local tribal law in favor of outsider
federal law.8 While many tribal judges have issued opinions
and made decisions that attempt to expand the boundaries of
tribal court jurisdiction, 9 they tend to do so within the context,
background, and restrictions of federal Indian law, not tribal
law. That is changing, slowly, as Indian nations like the Nava-
jo Nation generate statutes codifying their courts' jurisdictional
boundaries relying more on tribal law, finally favoring local
(tribal) law over outsider law.10 But because the vast majority
of federal and tribal courts assume that federal courts have
plenary authority over tribal courts, the Navajo Nation appears
to be more of an outlier than a doctrinal leader.11
7. See, e.g., In re Pamame, No. 00-12-707-CV, 2000 WL 35749804 (Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Tribal Ct. Dec. 21, 2000) (comply-
ing with federal bankruptcy court orders).
8. Examples abound that incorporate federal law into tribal constitutions,
e.g., CONST. OF THE LITTLE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS art. I, § 2, available
at https://www.1rboi-nsn.gov/council/ordinances.html ("The Tribe's jurisdiction
over its members and territory shall be exercised to the fullest extent consistent
with this Constitution, the sovereign powers of the Tribe, and federal law"); and
tribal constitutional jurisprudence, e.g., Lewis v. Ho-Chunk Nation Election Bd., 7
Am. Tribal Law 84, 101 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 2007) (relying upon Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and other federal authorities).
9. E.g., Wolf Point Org. v. Inv. Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 3 Am. Tribal Law 290 (Fort
Peck Ct. App. 2001); Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 4 Am. Tribal Law 90 (Ct.
App. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes 2003).
10. See NAVAJO NATION CODE, tit. 7, § 253(a)(3) (2010) (recognizing tribal
court jurisdiction over "[a]ll other matters provided by Navajo Nation statutory
law, Din6 bi beenahaz'ianii, and Navajo Nation Treaties with the United States
of America or other governments" and "[a]ll causes of action recognized in law,
including general principles of American law applicable to courts of general juris-
diction").
11. The long-running case MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057
(10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1181 (2008), perhaps exemplifies the status
of the Navajo judiciary as the leading tribal court asserting jurisdiction over non-
members in the face of federal court orders denying its authority.
2010] 975
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This Paper is not a call for a return to a time when the
United States gave significant legal credence to whether an In-
dian tribe consented to the dispossession of its sovereignty (as-
suming such a time really existed). Instead, this Paper is part
of a call for a paradigm-shifting re-examination by Indian tri-
bes and Indian people about their place in the American consti-
tutional structure. For tribal advocates to prevail in the feder-
al judiciary, they must force federal judges to rethink federal
Indian law. There are at least two ways to do this. Tribal ad-
vocates and American Indian law scholars must first establish
a baseline of knowledge and information about the realities of
Indian country in the twenty-first century. This work is nas-
cent and ongoing, if not burgeoning, but is far from enough.12
A second strategy must be a strategy itself, litigation with an
eye toward presenting the best cases before the federal judi-
ciary and the Supreme Court. As any litigator knows, facts win
a case, not general truths.
In this Paper, I argue for a theory of tribal consent and re-
sistance to federal government control embodied in the Su-
preme Court's assertion of federal court supervision over tribal
court civil jurisdiction. The Court established the supervisory
role of federal courts over tribal courts in 1985's National Far-
mers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,13 which es-
tablished a pure federal common law cause of action to review
the jurisdiction of tribal courts over nonmembers. National
Farmers is ripe for re-examination, if not outright reversal.
Tribes never consented to such a broad-based assertion of fed-
eral court jurisdiction, although tribes could consent if asked. I
propose methods by which tribes and their appellate counsel
can resist such jurisdiction and, perhaps in the same breath,
establish a meaningful recognition by the Supreme Court of the
legitimacy of tribal justice systems.
12. The most obvious failure has been the concentrated effort of the tribal
amicus briefs in the Plains Commerce litigation to demonstrate the fairness of tri-
bal courts and tribal law to outsiders and to highlight the fact that the non-
Indian-owned bank objecting to tribal court jurisdiction had previously relied
upon the tribal court more than a dozen times in the past. See generally Jesse
Sixkiller, Procedural Fairness: Ensuring Tribal Civil Jurisdiction after Plains
Commerce Bank, 26 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 779 (2009). The Office of Solicitor
General adopted the views of Indian law scholars on this point, see Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 28 n.15, Plains
Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008) (No.
07-411), but those views did not persuade a majority of the Court.
13. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
976 [Vol. 81
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In Part I, I note that Indian nations, for historical, politi-
cal, and many other reasons, have offered their consent to the
United States in many contexts, from land sales to governmen-
tal service provisions-usually in the context of a Senate-
ratified, Presidentially-proclaimed treaty. A key foundational
element of federal Indian law is that Indian tribes retain all
elements of sovereignty except those that Congress has expli-
citly divested, or those elements that the tribes themselves ex-
pressly consented to be divested, or those elements that have
succumbed to the Supreme Court's assertion of the "overriding
interests of the National Government."1 4 I note how the Unit-
ed States has repeatedly asserted more authority over Indian
nations and Indian people than to which Indians and tribes ev-
er consented.
In Part II, I describe in general terms a new theory of
American Indian tribal consent and resistance to federal gov-
ernment control, borrowing from classical consent theory but
deviating in important ways. In effect, I describe a theory of
tribal consent that generates room for Indian nations to resist
federal control over certain aspects of internal tribal gover-
nance.
In Part III, I offer an example of tribal resistance, in this
instance, to federal control over the jurisdiction of tribal justice
systems over nonmembers. The Supreme Court's assertion of
authority to determine the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts is
based entirely on rules of its own creation that conflict with
Congressional public policy favoring tribal courts. 15 I propose
two means of resistance, one of which is based on persuading
the Court to reverse its own rules, and the other based on ac-
tive, strategic resistance to federal court orders enjoining the
activities of tribal courts.
In Part IV, I suggest that successful tribal resistance to
federal control is the core of preserving tribal sovereignty. It
has been so in the past and will continue to be so. Unfortu-
14. See Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,
447 U.S. 134, 153-54 (1980) ("Tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue
of the tribes' dependent status. This Court has found such a divestiture in cases
where the exercise of tribal sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding
interests of the National Government, as when the tribes seek to engage in foreign
relations, alienate their lands to non-Indians without federal consent, or prose-
cute non-Indians in tribal courts which do not accord the full protections of the
Bill of Rights.") (emphasis added).
15. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Poli-
cy, 85 NEB. L. REV. 121, 154-63 (2006).
2010] 977
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nately, the key subject of tribal resistance is no longer Con-
gress or the executive branch, but is now the United States Su-
preme Court. However, successful resistance can generate tri-
bal investment in the American constitutional polity, hopefully
infusing more fairness and legitimacy into the federal-state-
tribal relationship.
I. THE DEARTH OF TRIBAL AND INDIVIDUAL INDIAN CONSENT
TO AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND POLICY
There is no serious doubt that Indian nations are now a
part of the American constitutional polity. Yes, the states and
the federal government are the government entities that form
the backbone of American constitutional governance, but In-
dian nations have become the so-called "third sovereign."1 6
How did this happen? While the Constitution defines in rela-
tive detail the metes and bounds of federal and state sovereign-
ty, it is silent as to tribal sovereignty. In fact, as the Supreme
Court has noted, no one invited Indian tribes to the Constitu-
tional convention or otherwise asked them to ratify the Consti-
tution. 17 The Constitution has never been amended to include
Indian tribes in the federal-state sovereign balance,18 nor has
the Supreme Court identified or adopted any common law in-
corporation theory that would have the same or similar effect,
despite a number of theories available to accomplish this pur-
pose. 19 Nor have any Indian tribes or Congress tried to ex-
pressly incorporate tribes into the American dual-sovereign
constitutional polity.
And yet, somehow they are the "third sovereign."
Tribal sovereignty arguably is at its strongest since prior
to the establishment of non-Indian governments on Native soil,
and certainly since the establishment of the American Republic
in the late eighteenth century. 20 Indian nations are immune
16. Sandra Day O'Connor, Lessons from the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal
Courts, 33 TULSA L. REV. 1, 1 (1997).
17. See Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak & Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 782
(1991).
18. See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BROKEN LANDSCAPE: INDIANS, INDIAN TRIBES,
AND THE CONSTITUTION 304-08 (2009).
19. E.g., Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Dialogic of Federalism in Federal Indian
Law and the Rehnquist Court: The Need for Coherence and Integration, 8 TEX. J.
C.L. & C.R. 1 (2003); see also Carol Tebben, An American Trifederalism Based
upon the Constitutional Status of Tribal Nations, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 318 (2003).
20. See generally CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF
MODERN INDIAN NATIONS (2005).
978 [Vol. 81
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from suit in federal, state, and tribal courts, 2 1 as well as im-
mune from state taxation and regulation inside of Indian coun-
try.22 Indian nations retain important treaty rights to hunt,
fish, and gather, 23 as well as land and water rights.24 Indian
nations have the authority to establish separate and indepen-
dent governments, 25 to define their own citizenship require-
ments, 26 to regulate the activities of their own citizens, 27 and
even to punish the crimes of their own citizens and the citizens
of other Indian nations. 28 Indian nations even have some au-
thority to tax and regulate the activities of non-Indians on In-
dian lands.29 Tribal sovereignty, as defined and constrained by
federal Indian law, is robust.
From the point of view of non-tribal outsiders, however,
the authority of Indian nations is defined and confined by go-
vernmental entities-Congress, the executive branch, and the
federal judiciary-that are acting under a written, organic doc-
ument (the Constitution) to which Indian tribes never con-
sented or ratified. Under fundamental tenets of federal Indian
law articulated by these non-tribal outsiders, tribal sovereignty
is retained absent one of three actions: (1) voluntary divestiture
by the Indian tribe via treaty or other agreement; (2) involun-
tary divestiture by Act of Congress; or (3) involuntary divesti-
ture by the Supreme Court, a process usually referred to as
"implicit divestiture." 30
21. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Honyaoma v.
Nuvamsa, 7 Am. Tribal Law 320 (Hopi App. Ct. 2008).
22. E.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (state
regulation); In re Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866) (state taxation).
23. E.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172
(1998); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979); United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich.
1979).
24. E.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (water rights); Oneida
Indian Nation of N.Y. v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 414 U.S. 661 (1974) (land
claims).
25. E.g., 25 U.S.C. § 476 (2006).
26. E.g., United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
27. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1959) (Indians' right to make
their own laws and be ruled by them).
28. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (nonmember Indians);
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
29. E.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
30. See generally DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 3 (5th ed. 2005) [hereinafter GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS]. On "implicit divestiture," see David H. Getches, Conquering the
Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84
CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1595-1618 (1996) [hereinafter Getches, Conquering the Cul-
20101 979
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Indian nations long have entered into give-and-take ar-
rangements with outsider governments and individuals. For
literally centuries before the establishment of the United
States, Indian nations entered into treaties and land sale
agreements with outsiders31 and with each other. 32 In many
treaties and agreements with the United States, Indian nations
agreed to let go of their external sovereignty and to place them-
selves under the "protection" of the American government, with
the preservation of their internal sovereignty guaranteed as a
concomitant matter. In a classic example, the Cherokee Nation
of Georgia did exactly that, agreeing to cede much of their tra-
ditional land base to the United States in exchange for the fed-
eral government's promise to hold the borders of their remain-
ing lands sacrosanct. 33 Justice Thompson's dissenting opinion
in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,34 coupled with Chief Justice
Marshall's majority opinion in Worcester v. Georgia,35 estab-
lished (for a short time) that Indian nations like the Cherokee
Nation that had voluntarily placed themselves under the "pro-
tection" of the United States retained significant inherent sove-
reignty, much like a nation under international law that
agreed to serve as a junior partner in a military or economic al-
liance. Justice Thompson invoked Emanuel Vattel's The Law
of Nations in opining that the Cherokee Nation, as a
"[t]ributary and feudatory state[], do[es] not thereby cease to be
[a] sovereign and independent stat[e], so long as self-
government, and sovereign and independent authority is left in
the administration of the [Cherokee Nation]. "36 A year later, in
the second Cherokee case, the Supreme Court all but adopted
Justice Thompson's formulation, describing Indian nations as
"distinct, independent political communities." 37 Quoting Vat-
tural Frontier]; Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Court's Use of the Implicit Divestiture
Doctrine to Implement Its Imperfect Notion of Federalism in Indian Country, 36
TULSA L.J. 267, 270-80 (2000).
31. See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF
A POLITICAL ANOMALY 23-24 (1994) (treaties); STUART BANNER, HOW THE
INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER (2005) (land sales).
32. See 1 VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND J. DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS,
1775-1979, at 6-7 (1999).
33. See JILL NORGREN, THE CHEROKEE CASES: TWO LANDMARK FEDERAL
DECISIONS IN THE FIGHT FOR SOVEREIGNTY 26 (2004).
34. 30 U.S. 1, 49, 5 Pet. 1, 50 (1831) (Thompson, J., dissenting).
35. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 515 (1832).
36. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 53 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing
EMANUEL VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 16, 17 (1758)).
37. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559.
[Vol. 81980
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tel, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that Indian nations do not
"surrender [their] independence-[their] right to self-
government, by associating with a stronger [nation], and tak-
ing its protection."38
The United States primarily relied upon treaty-making
with Indian nations-as opposed to mere conquest-to acquire
lands and to settle the western borders of Indian country. 39
The key concomitant outcome of that political decision (as con-
firmed by the Cherokee cases) was the recognition of Indian
nations as sovereign entities:
One of the ingredients of the process, however, was treat-
ment of tribes as political entities to the extent necessary to
procure their consent to cession of their right to occupy the
land. The process of obtaining Indian lands and containing
the tribes was largely done by recognizing them as sove-
reigns, then negotiating agreements with their representa-
tives. The motive was as much to facilitate expedient colo-
nization by the Europeans as it was to deal humanely with
natives. It put the colonizing nation and its successors in
the position of the exclusive purchaser of Indian title (as
against other Europeans) and it limited that "title" to a
right of occupancy. The legal legacy became a source of
foundational principles that were incorporated in the law of
the United States when it was founded and which persist
today in federal Indian law. 40
The common nomenclature for Indian nations now is "do-
mestic dependent nations," the term Chief Justice Marshall
used in his lead opinion in Cherokee Nation,41 but the differ-
ence between the two phrases is not terribly relevant here.42
38. Id. at 561.
39. See Eric Kades, The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M'Intosh and the
Expropriation of Indian Lands, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1065 (2000). But see Terry L.
Anderson & Fred S. McChesney, Raid or Trade? An Economic Model of Indian-
White Relations, 37 J.L. & EcoN. 39 (1994) (implying that violence was the more
efficient method, at least in lands west of the Mississippi River); Douglas W. Al-
len, Homesteading and Property Rights, or, "How the West Was Really Won," 34
J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1991).
40. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 30, at 2-3.
41. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16, 5 Pet. at 17 (Marshall, C.J.).
42. It would be relevant if this Paper discussed Indian nations, for example,
not as Indian governments under the plenary control of the federal government
but as Westphalian nations, as perhaps contemplated by documents such as the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and many Indian
treaties executed in the early years of the American Republic.
2010] 981
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As such, the first prong of the divestiture of tribal sove-
reignty was-and continues to be-voluntary. Indian nations
did not (and perhaps cannot, absent an express mechanism) ra-
tify the American Constitution as their own, but they have a
very real place in the American constitutional polity as partial-
ly independent sovereigns subject to laws of their own making
and enforcement. And, of note, that place in the constitutional
structure is a theoretical place Indian nations have consented
to occupy, either through virtue of treaty or by virtue of the
pursuit and acceptance of federal protection through what is
now known as "federal recognition."43
Congress ended the practice of making treaties with Indian
nations by 1871 and instead opted to rely exclusively on legis-
lation in its dealings with Indians and Indian tribes.44 But in
the latter half of the nineteenth century, Congress routinely
asserted what would later be described as near-absolute "ple-
nary power" over Indian affairs. 45 During this period, the
second method by which tribal sovereignty would be divested-
via unilateral Act of Congress-became the primary method.
Tribal consent, which had been the nominally exclusive method
of divestiture, became utterly subverted. The first significant
instance of Congress affirmatively imposing federal control
over Indian affairs without tribal consent is the Major Crimes
Act, passed in 1885,46 where Congress extended federal crimi-
nal jurisdiction over certain felonies to include Indian-on-
Indian crime within Indian country.47 The Supreme Court, in
43. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Commentary, Politics, History, and
Semantics: The Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes, 82 N.D. L. REV. 487 (2006).
44. See George William Rice, Indian Rights: 25 U.S.C. § 71: The End of In-
dian Sovereignty or a Self-Limitation of Contractual Ability?, 5 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 239, 239-40 (1977).
45. See Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard
Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence,
1986 Wis. L. REV. 219, 258-64 (1986). See also Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inhe-
rent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Ori-
gins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 28-81 (2002) (dis-
cussing history and case law of the power over Indian affairs). Examples of "near-
absolute plenary power" can be found in Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian
Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62 YALE L.J. 348 (1953). One
egregious example noted there was federal officers mandating bedtimes for cer-
tain Indians. See id. at 360.
46. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)).
47. The Supreme Court in Exparte Kan-gi-Shun-ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556
(1883), had held that federal criminal jurisdiction did not extend to Indian coun-
try crime, provoking Congressional action. See generally Kevin K. Washburn,
982 [Vol. 81
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United States v. Kagama,48 broadly swept aside the first chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of the statute on grounds that
Congress, while not explicitly authorized under the Indian
Commerce Clause to enact a general criminal law in Indian
country, still had authority to do so by virtue of the extreme
dependency of Indian people. 49 Whether a group of poor Indian
people who could not vote but lived within the territorial bor-
ders of the United States consented to the imposition of outside
criminal law was, for the Court, not even worth mentioning.
Perhaps the worst Supreme Court case affirming unilater-
al Congressional divestiture is Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.50 There,
federal negotiators sought to reopen a settled Indian treaty, the
Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek, that established a reservation
for Kiowa and Comanche people, later joined by Apache
people. 51 Article 12 of that treaty prohibited the cession of any
reserved lands absent the written consent of three-fourths of
the adult males occupying the reserved lands. 52 After scouring
the reservation seeking the necessary signatures to consent to
the allotment of the tribal land base, federal officials reported
to Congress that they had the necessary signatures, though in
reality the number was well short of three-fourths. 53 Soon the-
reafter, hundreds of Indians published a memorial with Con-
gress with an objection to the allotment of their lands, citing
the treaty and alleging fraud on the part of the federal officials
seeking consent.54 After Congress chose to proceed anyway,
the Indians sued and the case reached the Supreme Court,
where the Court held: "Plenary authority over the tribal rela-
tions of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the
beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political
one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of
Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 779, 790-
808 (2006) (discussing the Major Crimes Act and the history leading up to it).
48. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
49. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 379, 383-84.
50. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
51. See DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 105-06 (1997); JOSEPH WILLIAM
SINGER, PROPERTY 769-71 (3d ed. 2010); Kristen A. Carpenter, Contextualizing
the Losses of Allotment through Literature, 82 N.D. L. REV. 605 (2006).
52. See Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 554 (quoting Treaty with the Kiowas and Com-
anches, U.S.-Kiowa & Comanche Tribes of Indians, art. 12, Oct. 21, 1867, 15 Stat.
581).
53. See WILKINS, supra note 51, at 106-07.
54. See id.
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the government."55 In other words, Congressional power to
dispose of Indian lands, what the Court called "full administra-
tive power," 56 would not be limited or even reviewed by the fed-
eral judiciary. As a result, tribal consent literally became irre-
levant.
During this period, and well into the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, the federal bureaucracy took Congress's lead in under-
mining tribal governments. Without Congressional authoriza-
tion, the Department of Interior authorized the creation of
model law and order codes, to be enforced by "tribal police" in
"tribal courts."57 Indians prosecuted under these federal codes
who sought release via habeas writ in federal courts were faced
with paternalistic, unsympathetic judges, as in United States v.
Clapox.58 Following the reasoning of Lone Wolf, the court there
concluded that executive branch power to create the tribal
courts and the tribal laws was implied from the federal duty to
"civilize" reservation Indians: "[T]he reservation itself is in the
nature of a school, and the Indians are gathered there, under
the charge of an agent, for the purpose of acquiring the habits,
ideas, and aspirations which distinguish the civilized from the
uncivilized man."59
Federal bureaucratic control over Indian communities from
the last half of the nineteenth century into the later decades of
the twentieth century was far more pervasive and insidious
than Congressional control and served to unofficially (if not il-
legally) divest tribal governments of enormous authority, at
least temporarily. Congress authorized much of this federal
control over Indian County, but the Bureau of Indian Affairs
and others fervently throttled tribal governments and religion.
Felix Cohen famously detailed the incredible and capricious
iron hand that local federal officers used to dominate Indian
communities in the early years of the Termination Era
(1950s), 60 which included efforts to undermine Indian religions
55. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 565.
56. Id. at 568.
57. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE 111-16 (1983); ORVILLE N. OLNEY & DAVID H. GETCHES,
INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE: REPORT OF THE NAICJA LONG RANGE
PLANNING PROJECT 7-13 (1978).
58. 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888).
59. Clapox, 35 F. at 577.
60. During the Termination Era, Congress sought to terminate its relation-
ship with Indian nations, succeeding in "terminating" over 100 tribes. See gener-
ally FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 1013-84 (1984).
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and tribal economies, and virtually all other efforts at cultural
preservation and self-governance.61 Others have described how
federal military officials perverted treaty-guaranteed education
programs into boot camps designed to destroy tribal cultures
and languages. 62 Still others have described how federal offi-
cials used federal law to dispossess Indian people of their land
base. 63 Once again, tribal consent was irrelevant.
One little-known series of incidents involving Indian lands
on South Fox Island in Lake Michigan 64 perfectly exemplifies
the disconnect between Indian consent and federal government
control. As a result of the failed implementation of mid-
nineteenth-century treaties designed to reserve a land base for
Odawa and Ojibwe people in northwest lower Michigan, Con-
gress and the Department of Interior made land available on
the island.65 Twenty-two Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and
Chippewa families selected land on the island and lived there
for decades, but in the 1950s the Department of Interior sought
to sell the land to timber interests. 66 Since Indian people rare-
ly executed wills during that time, by then each parcel had sev-
eral owners after the original homesteaders passed away. The
government officials engaged in what is now known as a Secre-
tarial transfer, where "BIA officials approved sales of inherited
allotments on reservations without the consent of all beneficial
61. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 353-55 (interference with tribal elections),
356 (interference with freedom of speech), 359-61, 371-74 (freedom in Indian per-
sonal life, religion, and economies).
62. See, e.g., BILL DUNLOP & MARCIA FOUNTAIN-BLACKLIDGE, THE INDIANS
OF HUNGRY HOLLOW 131-40 (2004) (describing life at the Holy Childhood of Jesus
School in Harbor Springs, Michigan); LANNIKO L. LEE, FLORESTINE KIYUKANPI
RENVILLE, KAREN LONE HILL & LYDIA WHIRLWIND SOLDIER, SHAPING SURVIVAL:
ESSAYS BY FOUR AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL WOMEN (Jack W. Marken & Charles
L. Woodard eds., 2002) (describing life at Bureau of Indian Affairs schools).
63. E.g., JANET A. McDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN
INDIAN 1887-1934, at 87-102 (1991) (describing federal agents' use of "competen-
cy commissions" to impose fee patents on Indian allottees, thereby making the In-
dian allotees' land alienable to non-Indians at an earlier time); Bruce A. Rubens-
tein, Justice Denied: Indian Land Frauds in Michigan, 1855-1900, 2 THE OLD
NORTHWEST 131 (1976).
64. See Wenona T. Singel & Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Power, Authority, and
Tribal Property, 41 TULSA L. REV. 21, 28-33 (2005).
65. See Act of June 10, 1872, ch. 424, 17 Stat. 381; Act of June 10, 1875, ch.
188, 18 Stat. 516; Act of May 23, 1876, ch. 105, 19 Stat. 55.
66. James M. McClurken, South Fox Island: Its Historical Importance to the
Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians 42-43, 66-67 (Aug. 28,
2001) (unpublished draft report, on file with the University of Colorado Law Re-
view).
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heirs."67 In short, the government sent each heir a letter ask-
ing them to consent to sale. If they signed (and few did), they
consented. 68 If they did not, the government declared them in-
competent and, as guardian, consented to the sale on their be-
half as nominal "trustee."69
The historical practice on the part of Congress and the Ex-
ecutive branch of making and enforcing laws-and often pur-
porting to own all Indian property-without the consent of In-
dian governments and Indian people perhaps contributed to
the current views of the Supreme Court that the Court can de-
cide federal Indian common law in accordance with the way
"the current state of affairs ought to be." 70 Since 1978, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly invoked the Court-made doctrine
of "implicit divestiture" to rework the "state of affairs" in cases
where Congressional guidance is nonexistent or vague. It
bears noting that prior to 1978 the Court had not applied the
doctrine of implicit divestiture since 1823's Johnson v.
M'Intosh, where the Court held that Indian nations do not have
the capacity to alienate aboriginal Indian title to anyone except
the United States.71
In 1978, the Court decided Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, holding that Indian nations do not have criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians. 72 Congress had expressly recognized
ongoing and inherent tribal criminal jurisdiction for many tri-
bes in numerous treatieS73 and had strongly implied its recog-
67. Covelo Indian Cmty. v. Watt, No. 82-2377, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23138,
at *8 n.9 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 21, 1982).
68. One consenter received a check for $5 from the government, the value of
their interest in the land. McClurken, supra note 66, at 74.
69. Id. at 71.
70. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier, supra note 30, at 1575 (quot-
ing Memorandum from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
(Apr. 4, 1990) (Duro v. Reina, No. 88-6546), in Papers of Justice Thurgood Mar-
shall (reproduced from the Collections of the Manuscript Division, Library of Con-
gress)); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's Pursuit of
States'Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267,
268 (2001) (same).
71. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). Even that instance was merely the
extension of an Act of Congress (the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, ch. 33, 1
Stat. 137 (codified as amended in part at 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2006))) to the period of
time between the Founding of the American Republic to the date of the statute,
1790. Cf. LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF
AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 19 (2005).
72. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
73. E.g., Means v. Dist. Court of Chinle Judicial Dist., 7 Navajo Rptr. 383
(Navajo 1999), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/cases/navajo/
means.htm (describing the tribal criminal jurisdiction authority recognized in
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nition of tribal criminal jurisdiction in all tribes in the Indian
Civil Rights Act. 74 But Congress had never legislated in the
context of tribal criminal jurisdiction specifically over non-
Indians, despite open and notorious prosecutions of non-
Indians by some tribes such as the Cherokee Nation.75 In Oli-
phant, the Court went to great lengths to discern how Congress
would have legislated on the question of tribal criminal juris-
diction over non-Indians in the absence of such legislation, re-
lying upon an unusual collection of government documents, in-
cluding legislative history of failed Congressional bills and an
Interior Solicitor opinion that had been revoked by the De-
partment. 76 The Court concluded that there was an "unspoken
assumption" in Congress that tribes did not possess such juris-
diction. 77 In a second portion of the decision, the Court noted
that the Suquamish Tribe had acknowledged a "dependence"
upon the United States in the Treaty of Point Elliott,78 and in-
terpreted that language to mean that "the Suquamish were in
all probability recognizing that the United States would arrest
and try non-Indian intruders who came within their Reserva-
tion."79 This raises an important nineteenth-century under-
standing-that tribes must consent to divestitures of tribal so-
vereignty before they become effective. But unlike several
other Indian treaties that went into some detail about which
sovereign would have jurisdiction over Indian country crime, 80
the Point Elliott treaty was silent. 81 Perhaps the tribes and
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Navajo Tribe of Indians,
U.S.-Navajo, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667).
74. Congress presumed extant tribal criminal jurisdiction in providing for
federal habeas review of tribal criminal convictions in Civil Rights Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 203, 82 Stat. 73, 78, (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006)).
75. See J. Matthew Martin, The Nature and Extent of the Exercise of Criminal
Jurisdiction by the Cherokee Supreme Court: 1823-1835, 32 N.C. CENT. L.J. 27,
57-60 (2009).
76. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197-206; ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A
LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL
HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 97-113 (2005); Ezekiel J.N. Fletcher, Trapped in
the Spring of 1978: The Continuing Impact of the Supreme Court's Decision in
Oliphant, Wheeler, and Martinez, FED. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 36, 37-40.
77. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 203.
78. Treat of Point Elliot, U.S.-Allied Tribes of Wash. Territory, Jan. 22, 1855,
12 Stat. 927.
79. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 207.
80. E.g., Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the
Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137, 1190-91 (1990)
(describing the Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868, U.S.-Sioux Indians, Apr. 29, 1868,
15 Stat. 635).
81. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 206.
2010] 987
HeinOnline  -- 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 987 2010
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
the government never considered the question during treaty
negotiations, or maybe they did consider the question and de-
cided to leave it for another day. There is no way of knowing
155 years later. And so the Court's conclusion that the Suqu-
amish Tribe was impliedly consenting to the divestiture cannot
be taken seriously as valid tribal consent.82
Judicial divestiture of tribal sovereignty through an an-
nouncement of "unspoken" Congressional intent or assumed
tribal consent creates a host of institutional problems for the
Supreme Court. The strongest criticism of such decision-
making is that the Court is undertaking a naked power grab-
or, as Frank Pommersheim aptly puts it, asserting "judicial
plenary power" in Indian affairs. 83 The Supreme Court is no
policy maker; that's a job for the political branches. 84 Chief
Justice Roberts' analogy that the job of a Supreme Court Jus-
tice is equivalent to being a baseball umpire85 is belied by the
Court's decisions in federal Indian law that serve to divest In-
dian nations of sovereignty on grounds similar to the Oliphant
decision. And for a few years after the Oliphant decision, the
Supreme Court appeared to struggle with how to cabin its re-
discovered tool. In United States v. Wheeler, the Court noted
that tribal government authority had been implicitly divested
in only three areas: (1) the authority to freely alienate land; (2)
the authority to enter into commercial or governmental rela-
tions with foreign nations; and (3) the authority to prosecute
nonmembers (the Court had said "non-Indians" in Oliphant,
but changed that to "nonmembers" in Wheeler without discus-
sion or explanation) in tribal court.86 The second example is
not an example of judicially-divested authority because it is
based on the Cherokee cases, where the Supreme Court identi-
82. Even the Court acknowledged that the Tribe had not consented to the al-
lotment of its reservation, suggesting that implied consent to the loss of criminal
jurisdiction was invalid. Id. at 193 n.1; see also Judith Resnik, Tribes, Wars, and
the Federal Courts: Applying the Myth and Methods of Marbury v. Madison to
Tribal Courts' Criminal Jurisdiction, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 77, 105-06 (2004).
83. Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts and the Federal Judiciary: Opportun-
ities and Challenges for a Constitutional Democracy, 58 MONT. L. REV. 313, 328
(1997).
84. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118
HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1813-42 (2005); Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Re-
view, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 266-70 (2005).
85. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 55-56 (2005), cited in Michael P. Allen, A Limited Defense of (At
Least Some of) the Umpire Analogy, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 525, 525 n.1 (2009).
86. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
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fied language in the various treaties executed by the tribes
(namely, "protection") that served to divest the Cherokee Na-
tion of external sovereignty. A few years later, in Washington
v. Confederated Colville Tribes, the Court noted that only the
"overriding interests of the National government" justified the
implicit divestiture of tribal authority.87
But then in Montana v. United States, the Court held that
Indian tribes do not have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers on
reservation fee land either, with minor exceptions." This out-
come, of course, turned the foundational federal Indian law
doctrine on its head, placing focus on what authority Congress
sees fit to affirmatively grant to Indian tribes as opposed to the
authority to which Indian nations had affirmatively agreed to
divest. Tribal consent to divestitures of tribal sovereignty had
further receded from the Court's view.
In the decades following Montana, the Supreme Court
rarely found an example suitable to justify tribal civil jurisdic-
tion over nonmembers. 89 Justice Ginsburg's damning opinion
in Strate v. A-1 Contractors conclusively held that Montana is
the "pathmarking" case when it comes to tribal jurisdiction, 90
and Justice Scalia's opinion in Nevada v. Hicks concluded that
tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers must fit within one of
the Montana exceptions even on trust land.91
Oliphant and Montana, it is fair to say, are the corner-
stones of current Supreme Court Indian law doctrines. Except
in key areas involving the administration of federal programs
benefitting Indian people, 92 Indian gaming,93 and a few other
87. 447 U.S. 134, 153 (1980).
88. 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
89. The exceptions are Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982)
(tribal tax on nonmember extraction of tribal natural resources); Kerr-McGee
Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (same); and Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers in "closed" area of
reservation). Contra Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 360 (2001) ("[W]ith one minor
exception, we have never upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil au-
thority over nonmembers on non-Indian land.") (citing Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137,
142) (emphasis added).
90. 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
91. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360.
92. E.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25
U.S.C. §§ 450 to 458bbb-2 (2006); Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. Leavitt, 543 U.S.
631 (2005).
93. See Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467
(1988) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 to 2721. (2006)); California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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discreet areas of federal Indian policy,94 Congress is slowly va-
cating the field of Indian affairs, rarely addressing important
national Indian affairs issues and, with tribal support, leaving
internal Indian affairs to tribes themselves. Despite efforts by
Indian nations to persuade Congress to legislate in response to
the Supreme Court's Oliphant and Hicks decisions, 95 as well as
a recent statutory interpretation case going against both In-
dian nations and the United States,96 Congress usually does
not respond to tribal efforts to enact omnibus legislation. 97
And so the Supreme Court is left to its own devices, which
almost always means that the Court will limit tribal authority.
Ironically, while the Supreme Court tends to ignore (or mis-
state) whether Indian nations have consented to the divest-
ment of tribal sovereign authority, the Court has explicitly held
that, in many contexts, tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers
depends entirely on the express and written consent of those
nonmembers. 98 Justice Kennedy has repeatedly articulated a
position on tribal jurisdiction based on his notion of consent
theory, finding that since nonmembers have not (and perhaps
cannot) participate in the tribal political process, they have not
consented to tribal law. 99 Some academic commentators have
joined Justice Kennedy in his view of consent theory in relation
to tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.100
94. E.g., Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069,
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 to 1963 (2006)).
95. E.g., D. Michael McBride III, The FBA's Indian Law Section: Vetting the
Important Issues Regarding Indian Country, FED. LAW. Mar.-Apr. 2008, at 4, 4
(Apr. 2008) (describing efforts to persuade Congress to enact an "Oliphant fix");
Skibine, supra note 19, at 34 (noting effort of tribes to persuade Congress to enact
a "Hicks fix").
96. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009).
97. Thanks to Addie Rolnick for this observation. The main exception is the
so-called Duro fix, enacted after the Supreme Court held that Indian nations do
not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S.
676 (1990). See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
98. E.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981) (holding that
Indian nations may not exercise civil jurisdiction over nonmembers unless the
nonmembers enter "consensual relationships" with the tribe).
99. E.g., Lara, 541 U.S. at 212 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Constitution is
based on a theory of original, and continuing, consent of the governed.. . . Here,
contrary to this design, the National Government seeks to subject a citizen to the
criminal jurisdiction of a third entity to be tried for conduct occurring wholly with-
in the territorial borders of the Nation and one of the States."); Duro, 495 U.S. at
693 ("The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition of certain addition-
al authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal members.").
100. E.g., T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE
CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 115-17, 146-47 (2002)
(identifying a "democratic deficit" in relation to tribal governments and non-
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The difficulty in Justice Kennedy's consent theory is ex-
posed if one considers the modern, consensus understanding of
consent theory-hypothetical consent.101 Hypothetical consent
theory asks whether a reasonable person subjected to govern-
ment control would consent to such control. 102 As such, the
question is whether a nonmember subject to tribal jurisdiction
would be reasonable in rejecting tribal law. If the tribal law
discriminates against nonmembers, then it would seem a rea-
sonable nonmember would object. But if tribal law is nondi-
scriminatory, a reasonable nonmember should not object. Tri-
bal laws at issue in Supreme Court cases involving tribal
jurisdiction include, for example, bars on assaults on law en-
forcement officials; 103 tribal taxation of nonmember businesses
relying upon tribal public services; 104 tribal taxation of non-
member extraction of natural resources from tribal lands;105
and statutory and common law tort law applied to nonmember
tortfeasors on tribal lands in claims brought by victims. 106
While closer cases might include tribal hunting and fishing
regulations that appear to discriminate against nonmemb-
ers,10 7 tribal statutes rarely are so unreasonable as to justify
resistance by nonmembers under hypothetical consent
theory.108 As such, Justice Kennedy's rhetoric invoking the
consent of the governed rings hollow at least in cases where a
members); L. Scott Gould, The Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Mil-
lennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996).
101. JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF
LAW AND POLITICS 335 (1994).
102. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971) (describing the "orig-
inal position").
103. Lara, 541 U.S. at 196; Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,
194 (1978).
104. Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647-48 (2001).
105. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 133 (1982).
106. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., Inc., 128 S.
Ct. 2709, 2714 (2008); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997).
107. Cf. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 325 (1983);
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
108. Consider, for example, the efforts by the tribe in Brendale v. Confederated
Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), to prevent non-
Indians from using their land in ways that would fundamentally impact sur-
rounding reservation land use; or, in Justice Blackmun's words:
And how can anyone doubt that a tribe's inability to zone substantial
tracts of fee land within its own reservation-tracts that are inextricably
intermingled with reservation trust lands-would destroy the tribe's
ability to engage in the systematic and coordinated utilization of land
that is the very essence of zoning authority?
Id. at 458 (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
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reasonable person would not object to tribal laws. Instead, it
would appear that Justice Kennedy's consent theory is based
more on "literal consent," as expressed perhaps in one of the
two circumstances the Supreme Court has held that nonmemb-
ers are subject to tribal civil jurisdiction-where they expressly
consent in the context of a commercial relationship.109
One could argue that the United States (represented in
these cases by the Supreme Court) is justified, even in the
modern era, in not caring for the consent of Indian nations, and
that the interests of the nation compel the federal government
to exercise control over Indian nations regardless of tribal con-
sent-a sort of pure utilitarian theory of Indian law. In fact,
the Supreme Court has recognized in the legislative and the
executive branch via delegation a form of plenary control over
the internal and external affairs of tribal governments without
clear (or perhaps even adequate) constitutional authority. In
United States v. Kagama, for example, the Supreme Court af-
firmed the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act, 110 Con-
gress's effort to extend federal criminal jurisdiction into Indian
country, despite holding that the Indian Commerce Clause-
the only plausible source of legislative authority-was insuffi-
cient constitutional authority to do so. 1  Instead, the Court
noted that Indian tribes resided on lands within the borders of
the United States, asserted that Indians were utterly depen-
dent upon the federal government for day-to-day survival, and
implied that Indian people could not effectively govern them-
selves. 112 These factors alone, according to the Court, autho-
rized Congress to assert federal criminal jurisdiction over In-
dian country.
The Supreme Court's Indian law jurisprudence long has
taken on the harsh vagaries of utilitarian theory that mani-
fested themselves strikingly in Korematsu v. United States.113
Recall in Korematsu that the Court apparently weighed the
perceived needs of a "community" (the United States as a
109. See Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
110. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
111. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 378-79. It bears mention that the Supreme
Court could not rely upon tribal consent to federal criminal jurisdiction via treaty
provisions because the Senate had never ratified the treaty executed by the Hoopa
Valley Tribe, the local tribal entity at issue in Kagama. See Bugenig v. Hoopa
Valley Tribe, 266 F.3d 1201, 1209 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
927 (2002).
112. See Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84.
113. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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whole), as understood in utilitarian theory, against the needs of
a minority of individuals (Japanese-Americans), foreclosing any
real chance that the minority group could prevail.114 The re-
sulting injustice continues to haunt American history to this
day. Modern consent theory (with hypothetical consent theory
part of this wave) arose as a counter to the harshness of utilita-
rianism, 115 ostensibly (and hopefully) putting future cases like
Korematsu in a different light for the Court to analyze.
But in federal Indian common law, consent theory is con-
spicuously absent. 116 The Court assumes that tribal consent to
the coercive authority of the federal government is irrelevant
by simply refusing to address it. In a kind of vicious circle,
since Indian nations are not parties to the Constitution, the
Supreme Court will refuse to apply federal common law in
their favor. And since they never consented, the response to
the harsh utilitarianism of the Court-consent theory-is in-
applicable, thereby seemingly justifying the application of the
utilitarian analyses.117
The outcomes in Indian law cases decided by the Supreme
Court are predictable under this regime. Consider statutory or
treaty interpretation cases, where tribal interests prevail in a
reasonable percentage of cases. There, Congress (or the Senate
in a treaty case) has spoken on behalf of the American "com-
munity," articulating an order of how the "community" (the
people) has decided to deal with a particular Indian law issue
or Indian nation. If the Supreme Court applied utilitarian
analyses to these questions, the result would be more obviously
an imposition of judicial policymaking, trumping the expressed
114 See id. at 220-24.
115. See RAWLS, supra note 102, at 175-92.
116. Other scholars suggest in parallel theories that the legal rights of indi-
genous peoples may have been "superseded" by time and changed circumstances.
E.g., Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 ETHICS 4, 20 (1992).
117. Frequently in recent decades, Congress has enacted legislation at the
behest of Indian country (plainly satisfying tribal consent requirements), but that
legislation often comes with important limitations and flaws vulnerable to federal
and state court critique and even evisceration. E.g., Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 to 2721 (2006), abrogated in part by Seminole Tribe of Flor-
ida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996); Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901
to 1963 (2006), called into question by In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 727-
31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2006) (reaffirming inherent tribal au-
thority to prosecute nonmember Indians), called into question by United States v.
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 211-14 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring), 214-26 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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will of the people."t8 But in federal Indian common law ques-
tions (that is, where Congress largely has not spoken), the
Court exclusively applies its utilitarian analysis, resulting in
exceptionally rare instances where tribal interests prevail in a
common law case. 119
What can tribes do in such a common law regime so pa-
tently hostile to tribal interests unprotected by the Constitu-
tion? Cooperate with each other? Indian nations have teamed
together to support each other in litigation before the federal
courts, but with largely negative results.120 Open resistance?
Indian nations, increasingly, are discussing active resistance to
federal court pronouncements of law.
Federal Indian law is marked with frequent assertions of
federal authority over Indian tribes without a source of author-
ity traced to tribal consent.121 But, assuming it is too late to
reset the federal-state-tribal relationship, we must at least ar-
ticulate and recognize a new theory of tribal consent.
II. TOWARD A TRIBAL CONSENT THEORY
Consent theory in American political theory derives from
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, but In-
dian tribes have never been a part of that political theory. The
Declaration treats Indian nations as objects of fear and hatred,
and the Constitution treats them as half-domestic, half-foreign
governments. A realistic consent theory for Indian tribes,
which I proffer as a desirable theory to consider, requires an
118. Arguably, the Supreme Court has trumped the will of the "community"
repeatedly in Indian law contexts. E.g., Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058, 1061
(2009) (striking down federal administrative practice after seventy-plus years of
Congressional acquiescence); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544
U.S. 197 (2005) (declining to give weight to Congressional statutes extending sta-
tutes of limitations in Indian land claims cases such as 28 U.S.C. § 2415(a)).
119. E.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (hold-
ing that federal interests in a tribal business operation preempted state taxes).
120. The Tribal Supreme Court Project arose in late 2001 as a means to coun-
teract the Supreme Court's hostility to tribal interests, see Charles Wilkinson,
"Peoples Distinct from Others": The Making of Modern Indian Law, 2006 UTAH L.
REV. 379, 384-85, with apparently no significant impact-tribal interests continue
to lose Supreme Court cases at the same rate as before and have not prevailed in
a case before the Court in the last six years, following Cherokee Nation of Okla. v.
Leavitt, 543 U.S. 631 (2005). See Turtle Talk, Supreme Court, http://
turtletalk.wordpress.com/resources/supreme-court-indian-law-cases/ (last visited
August 25, 2010).
121. E.g., Lara, 541 U.S. at 200 (citing multiple authorities unrelated to tribal
consent).
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examination of the treaties and other agreements between
tribes and the federal government, rather than fruitless re-
examination of American organic political documents. If In-
dian nations have not consented, then reasonable resistance to
actions by government is justifiable.
A. Consent Theory and Indian Tribes
The Declaration of Independence grounds American politi-
cal thought in the consent of the governed, with a heavy em-
phasis on Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, 122 using language ex-
pressly invoking consent theory. The Constitution does not use
the same language, but there can be little doubt the Framers
and the Ratifiers understood that the Constitution, by the very
act of breaking down the Articles of Confederation and recons-
tituting the government under the new document, fit within
the Declaration's consent theory.123
But the Constitution, like consent theory itself, is not
without powerful difficulties. The Constitution by its very
terms excludes the vast majority of persons who would be gov-
erned by the United States-African-Americans,1 24 women,125
whites with little or no property,126 and virtually all other
people of color, including American Indians, especially those
"Indians not taxed" considered by the Framers to be savages. 127
122. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by
their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness. -That to secure these rights, Governments are in-
stituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed
. . . ."); cf. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-
1787, at 283-84 (1972) (noting Locke's importance to the American Revolutiona-
ries after 1776).
123. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting "[t]he estab-
lishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of
a whole people .... ); GILLIAN BROWN, THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED: THE
LOCKEAN LEGACY IN EARLY AMERICAN CULTURE 15-17 (2001).
124. See LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, DARK BARGAIN: SLAVERY, PROFITS, AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR THE CONSTITUTION 7 (2005); DAVID WALDSTREICHER, SLAVERY'S
CONSTITUTION: FROM REVOLUTION TO RATIFICATION 153-54 (2009).
125. Laurence H. Tribe, Federal Judicial Power and the "Consent" of the Gov-
erned, in THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 207, 209 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1992).
126. Id.
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. See also Ralph Lerner, Reds and Whites:
Rights and Wrongs, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203 ("Above all, there was the belief
in the inevitability and rightness of the triumph of white civilization over red bar-
barism.").
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Later Amendments to the Constitution extending citizenship to
African-Americans and suffrage to women brought more per-
sons within the fold, but the Amendments to the Constitution
are limited, and expressly excluded, once again, American In-
dians. 128 Acts of Congress (despite Constitutional language
implying otherwise) have purported to fill some of the gaps in
the Constitution, especially in regard to American Indians. 129
But as Rob Porter notes, in the 1920s many Indian people did
not consent (and would not consent to this day) to becoming
American citizens. 130
Even assuming the Constitution provides for the inclusion
of all persons, there are serious theoretical problems with con-
sent theory as it might apply to the American polity. Early on,
Jefferson argued that the American people needed to reassess
the Constitution every nineteen years, in accordance with his
understanding of consent theory. 131 For Jefferson, consent was
more literal and express, meaning that the consent of the
American people in their government had to be reaffirmed each
generation in order to be valid. 132 But as we know from histo-
ry, the American people have not reassessed the Constitution
each generation and arguably have only amended the Constitu-
tion in a significant, fundamental manner once, during Recon-
struction. 133 Jeffersonian consent may, in fact, be impossible,
or even undesirable.
Key to consent theory is exit theory, the right to leave
when one does not consent to the government.134 Interestingly,
Indian tribes both pre-contact and post-colonization provide
important evidence on how exit works. Simple exit theory al-
lows for the non-consenters to leave when the government
128. See George Beck, The Fourteenth Amendment as Related to Tribal In-
dians: Section I, "Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof" and Section II, "Excluding
Indians Not Taxed," 28:4 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 37, 40 (2004).
129. E.g., Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-175, 43 Stat. 253
(1924); Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of the Na-
tive Americans: Redressing the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship
upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 107, 117-18 (1999).
130. See Porter, supra note 129, at 126-27.
131. Louis Henkin, The United States Constitution as Social Compact, 131
PRoC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 261, 264 (1987).
132. See id.
133. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 99 (1998);
SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
134. See Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL THEORY 165, 165-66 (1998); cf.
ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 106-19 (1970).
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proceeds with a course of action to which these persons strong-
ly disagree. It is often said that traditional tribal governments
operated under a consensus form of government, wherein every
person in the tribal community would have a say about a par-
ticular course of action, and the government would not act until
each person in the government consented to the action. 135 Of
course, this description is oversimplistic if applied to all Indian
nations. Many times, non-consenters simply left and joined
another community or started a new community.136 Those re-
maining, by definition (one could argue), were a consensus.
This is simple exit theory, wherein exit has relatively small
costs. 137 The non-consenters could leave without being coerced
to stay, had a place to go (often a similar and nearby tribal
community, where they had relatives), and could even retain a
connection to the community being left.138 The door would be
open, after a time, to return.
Complex exit theory as applied to modern nations involves
far higher exit costs. Non-consenters might be put in a position
where they cannot exit because of economic or legal limita-
tions. 139 The average person residing in the United States in
the twenty-first century likely has no practical means of exit as
a way to reject the government. Americans often leave one
state for another, but they rarely have the resources to leave
the entire United States on a permanent basis and might lose
all of their legal protections and property rights as an alien in
135. E.g., Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Nature and Spirit of North American
Political Systems, 10 AM. INDIAN Q. 181, 185-89 (1986); Robert B. Porter, Decolo-
nizing Indigenous Governance: Observations on Restoring Greater Faith and Legi-
timacy in the Government of the Seneca Nation, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POI'Y, Winter
1999, at 97, 114.
136. The histories of the three federally recognized Michigan Ottawa/Odawa
tribes is instructive, as Indians from all three communities (and several others
throughout Michigan and the entire Great Lakes region) would move from com-
munity to community dependent on their family or political interests. See Mat-
thew L.M. Fletcher, Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, Mich. St. Un-
iv. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-11, at 22-24 (2010), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1620603.
137. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 212 (1971) ("[P]articular associa-
tions may be freely organized as their members wish, and they may have their
own internal life and discipline subject to the restriction that their members have
a real choice of whether to continue their affiliation."), quoted in Green, supra
note 134.
138. Cf. HIRSCHMAN, supra note 134, at 98-99.
139. See Henkin, supra note 131 ("Many cannot in fact leave, and during some
periods of war or emergency departure is forbidden by law. In any event, is con-
sent present and authentic when there is only choice between departure and
submission?").
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their new nation. Indian nations, who are literally grounded in
their territorial homelands within the United States, cannot
exit either. In this context, the failure of a non-consenter to ex-
it is no evidence of consent.
Despite these limitations, political theorists take it as a
given that some form of exit must exist for consent theory to
function properly. While the practical right to exit in modern
times might be extremely difficult to exercise, it remains criti-
cal. Even if the right to exit is, in some ways, fictional, without
such a right, the governed are governed by coercion. 140 Or, in
another word, to expand upon Robert Cover: violence. 141
B. Hypothetical Consent, Indian Nations, and Resistance
"Hypothetical consent" is a theory that helps to avoid the
practical and logical problems of consent theory. This theory
requires that governments, in order to be legitimate, must be
governments that earn the consent of the people through time
by governing in an acceptable manner, as Hannah Pitkin notes:
[A] legitimate government, a true authority, one whose sub-
jects are obligated to obey it, emerges as being one to which
they ought to consent, quite apart from whether they have
done so. Legitimate government acts within the limits of
the authority rational men would, abstractedly and hypo-
thetically, have to give a government they are founding.
Legitimate government is government which deserves con-
sent. 142
She adds:
[Hypothetical consent] teaches that your obligation depends
not on any actual act of consenting, past or present, by
yourself or your fellow-citizens, but on the character of the
government. If it is a good, just government doing what a
government should, then you must obey it; if it is a tyran-
nical, unjust government trying to do what no government
may, then you have no such obligation. Or to put it another
140. Cf. Frederick G. Whelan, Citizenship and the Right to Leave, 75 AM. POL.
Scl. REV. 636, 641 (1981) (noting that the "feudal contract between vassal and
lord" could not be dissolved unilaterally).
141. Cf. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1610
(1986) ("violence of judges").
142. Hannah Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-I, 59 AM. POL. SC. REV. 990,
999 (1965) (citing STANLEY I. BENN & R.S. PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE
DEMOCRATIC STATE 323, 329 (1959)).
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way, your obligation depends not on whether you have con-
sented but on whether the government is such that you
ought to consent to it, whether its actions are in accord with
the authority a hypothetical group of rational men [and
women] in a hypothetical state of nature would have (had)
to give any government they were founding. 143
Pitkin's model assumes a few baseline factors. First, the
model presumes that a government has been formed in accor-
dance with some original contract, likely in the form of a foun-
dational document like the Constitution. Second, the model
presumes that there is some manner by which the persons
whom the government purports to govern can assess the per-
formance of the government on a real-time basis so as to make
informed judgments about the performance of the government.
This, almost by definition, requires an open and transparent
government. The United States government and the Constitu-
tion appear to fit the bill for these baseline factors. For Indian
tribes, a treaty, or even the act of federal recognition could
serve as the foundational document or moment.
Hypothetical consent is based on mere reasonability.
Pitkin makes clear that the governed people's assessment and
judgment of the government must be reasonable, 144 a useful
theoretical twist. She asserts that the people must look inward
on an individual basis to judge whether the government is
worth the consent that it demands.145 But her theoretical twist
creates another problem-what is reasonable, and to whom?
She offers the dichotomy of a just government and a tyrannical
government as a means to define, broadly, what she means by
reasonable. There are problems with the vagueness of this
theory, most especially in regard to how far a government must
go before consent is no longer earned. But for the purposes of
this proposal, the "just" versus "tyrannical" dichotomy could
suffice, given the extreme character of federal Indian law in
some contexts.
Pitkin does offer several hypotheticals to flesh out what
she means by a government that has earned the consent of its
governed. 146 In doing so, she completes her theoretical
143. Hannah Pitkin, Obligation and Consent-I, 60 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 39, 39
(1966).
144. See id. at 40-41.
145. See id. at 42.
146. See id. at 40 (listing several, including African-Americans in Mississippi,
Blacks in South Africa, and "minor official[s] in Nazi Germany").
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groundwork by introducing the concepts of resistance to and
revolution against an unjust government, grounded in no small
way in the right to exit. At some point, once the scales of "just"
versus "tyrannical" government have tipped far enough to the
"tyrannical" side, the governed stop consenting because the
government no longer deserves the consent of the governed. At
that point, Pitkin raises the question of when a person has an
affirmative obligation to resist the government. 147 She points
to the example of a rank-and-file Nazi, who knows what the
government is doing and knows that it is wrong on a funda-
mental level. 148 The Nazi hypothetical is an easy question, but
she also raises the hypothetical of an African-American citizen
in Mississippi during the 1950s and 1960s. 14 9 In this hypothet-
ical, we can use Pitkin's theory to create a nuance useful for
our purposes. Herein lies the distinction between the duties to
resist and the duties to revolt, though there are no exact lines.
The Nazi has an obligation to revolt, because the national gov-
ernment is utterly and completely tyrannical and illegal. The
African-American in the Jim Crow South is obligated to resist
local and state government, but not necessarily national gov-
ernment, especially after 1954's Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.150 The 1950s and 1960s United States government still
deserved, although perhaps only barely, the consent of its po-
pulace, while some local and state governments had likely lost
that status.151
Developing and parsing Pitkin's theory more, we reach the
question of whether individual acts of the government may be
resisted. Surely if the Supreme Court had decided Brown v.
Board of Education152 the other way, there would be a move to
resist the outcome. However, consider Roe v. Wade, 153 a deci-
sion that many people feel deserves the resistance of the
people, while many others just as strongly feel deserves the re-
147. See id. at 40-41.
148. See id. at 41.
149. See id; cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 110-11
(1975) (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (raising the same question from
the point of view of the Southern states)).
150. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
151. Cf. Pitkin, supra note 143, at 43-44 (describing how an individual could
evaluate a government to determine the legitimacy of that government, and
whether to consent to that government).
152 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
153. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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spect of the people. 154 Despite Pitkin's efforts to create a
roadmap of consent and resistance to government usable for
the common person, her theory breaks down here to some ex-
tent given the incredible and often illegal and violent resis-
tance generated by cases like Brown and Roe. A new dichoto-
my arises involving the relative amount of resistance to an act
of government that is valid and reasonable. Pitkin's articula-
tion of hypothetical consent implies that the threat of literal
resistance to government control is fundamental to her consent
theory, but she does not articulate how any reasonable person
could resist in a viable way. Hypothetical consent can be said,
perhaps, like all consent theory derivations, to be a failure.
However, Pitkin's theory of hypothetical consent creates
enough groundwork for the purposes of this project, which is to
analyze and theorize the consent of Indian tribes to the United
States government, and in particular the federal judiciary. A
theory of tribal consent must be cognizant of the reality of the
relationship between Indian nations and the federal govern-
ment, one that is based heavily on literal consent and reasona-
ble resistance.155 There are at least three key reasons why un-
altered hypothetical consent is simply insufficient in an
analysis of tribal consent. First, unlike American citizens and
even states, Indian nations (and individual Indians) have been
subjected to a wide variety of federal government laws and con-
trol throughout American history to which no reasonable per-
son or entity would consent. 156 Second, also unlike American
citizens and states, who are parties to the Constitution, Indian
nations have little or no remedy or protection in the Constitu-
tion from the ravages of government abuses. Finally, unlike
American citizens and states, which consented to a small num-
ber of organic documents such as the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the Constitution, each Indian nation's consent mani-
fests itself (if at all) in organic documents unique to each
154. Cf. Kevin W. Saunders, Privacy and Social Contract: A Defense of Judicial
Activism in Privacy Cases, 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 811, 818-19 (1991) (suggesting that
the social contract may limit the authority of legislatures in privacy cases).
155. Cf. DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY 245-
46 (1989) (recognizing substance to consent); id. at 3 (noting difference between
"choice" and "consent").
156. E.g., Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903) (upholding sale of Indian
land to non-Indians over opposition of Indian landowners); United States v. Sioux
Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (affirming money judgment relating to the
taking of Black Hills without tribal consent).
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Indian nation, such as treaties or other agreements and trans-
actions.
Incidents in American history support the ongoing give
and take between Indian nations and the United States. With-
out active and open resistance to federal (and state) govern-
ment abuses, there would be no Indian nations in the United
States today.157 Tribal and individual Indian resistance to fed-
eral law often is reasonable and occasionally very successful.
The next part details how Indian nations can and should resist
federal courts in the context of tribal court jurisdiction over
claims brought against nonmembers, one of the crisis points in
modern federal Indian law jurisprudence.
III. RESISTING FEDERAL COURT AUTHORITY OVER TRIBAL
COURT CIVIL ACTIONS
Non-tribal member activity in Indian country is some of
the least governed activity in the United States. State gov-
ernments generally have no criminal jurisdiction over non-
members in Indian country, 158 and even when they do their go-
vernance is weak and inefficient at best. 159 Tribal
governments have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indiansl 60
and severely circumscribed civil authority over nonmembers.161
The federal government has plenary authority over nonmemb-
ers in Indian country but little capacity to exercise that author-
ity. As a result, non-Indians are more likely to commit violent
crimes against Indians (especially Indian women 62), and non-
members are more likely to engage in destructive and exploita-
157. For example, recognition of treaty rights arose out of "fish-ins," assertions
of the right to fish without a state permit that technically violated state law. See,
e.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n., 443
U.S. 658 (1979). See generally Vine Deloria, Jr., Alcatraz, Activism, and Accom-
modation, in AMERICAN INDIAN ACTIVISM: ALCATRAZ TO THE LONGEST WALK 45,
47 (Troy R. Johnson, Joane Nagel, & Duane Champagne eds., 1997).
158. See Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1993) (citing cases); see
also Seymour v. Superintendent of Wash. State Penitentiary, 368 U.S. 351, 359
(1962).
159. See Carole Goldberg & Duane Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the
Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38 CONN. L. REV. 697, 698 (2006).
160. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
161. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997).
162. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MAZE OF INJUSTICE: THE FAILURE TO
PROTECT INDIGENOUS WOMEN FROM SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE USA 1-2 (2007),
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/maze/report.pdf.
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tive behavior in Indian country absent adequate civil controls
over them. 163
A. A Straight Challenge to National Farmers
It is time for Indian tribes to actively and strategically res-
ist the Supreme Court in the context of tribal court civil juris-
diction over nonmembers. The Supreme Court's authority to
declare what authority an Indian tribe possesses, especially a
tribal court, is doubtful. 164 The Court's authority to determine
whether a tribal court has authority over a nonmember in a
civil action is based on a federal common law cause of action
that the Court itself created in 1985.165 Once a nonmember in-
vokes the federal cause of action, the Court applies the two
Montana exceptions, 166 which are very limited exceptions to a
general rule barring tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers
that frequently forecloses tribal civil jurisdiction over non-
members, no matter how terrible and destructive their beha-
vior. Even tribal courts apply the Montana rubric (or at least
review whether Montana is consistent with the tribe's exercise
of jurisdiction), often limiting themselves by preemptively ap-
plying the Court's judge-made test firstl 67-a task many tribal
163. See N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 6-7 (2008) (can-
vassing several cases involving torts of non-Indians against Indian people).
164. This frequently overlooked point is far from a new observation. See Unit-
ed States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886) (questioning Congress's author-
ity under the Indian Commerce Clause); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 215
(2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (questioning Congress's authority under the In-
dian Commerce Clause and other constitutional provisions); VINE DELORIA, JR. &
DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, & CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 156-62
(1999); FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 120-22 (1995).
165. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
853-54 (1985); see also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
166. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
167. E.g., Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde v. Strategic Wealth Mgmt. Inc.,
6 Am. Tribal Law 126, 134-36 (Grand Ronde Tribal Ct. 2005) (applying Montana
to determine whether the court had jurisdiction over non-Indian financial advi-
sors); Smith v. Salish Kootenai Coll., 4 Am. Tribal Law 90, 96-99 (Salish-Kootenai
Ct. of App. 2003) (applying Montana to decide whether the court had jurisdiction
over non-Indian tortfeasor); Lilly v. Davis, 2 Am. Tribal Law 173, 175-78 (Fort
Peck Ct. of App. 2000) (applying Montana to decide whether the court had juris-
diction over non-Indian law enforcement officers); Ho-Chunk Nation v. Olsen, 2
Am. Tribal Law 299, 305-06 (Ho-Chunk Nation Tribal Ct. 2000) (applying Mon-
tana to determine whether the court had jurisdiction over non-Indian property
owners).
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courts are not obligated to undertake. The first step in tribal
resistance should be to apply a truly tribal jurisdictional test.
Many tribes have adopted constitutional provisions or sta-
tutes that articulate rules about tribal court jurisdiction that
differ from Montana in fundamental ways, though many of
these same tribes have adopted clauses noting that the tribe
will not go further than "federal law" proscribes.168 Other tri-
bes, such as the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians,
assert jurisdiction over all persons via the tribal constitution,
even those beyond tribal lands in certain circumstances, with-
out a federal law limitations clause. 169 Of note, the Navajo Na-
tion Supreme Court's jurisprudence recognizes the limitations
of Montana while focusing more on the treaties establishing
the Navajo reservation boundaries. 170
But a second and more important step is to resist the fed-
eral judiciary's assertion of jurisdiction to determine tribal
court jurisdiction, a step which might include tribal court ef-
forts to assert civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, perhaps even
in the face of a federal order to halt. This is a more difficult
step, but not if one recalls that Indian tribes never consented to
the Constitution and hence never consented to Supreme Court
judicial review or supervisory power. Moreover, Congress has
never even purported to extend to the Supreme Court the gen-
eral authority to decide questions of tribal court jurisdiction.
Under its own principles of judicial authority, and its own in-
terpretation of its Article III powers, the Supreme Court argu-
ably has no such authority and would not have even the pre-
tense of authority unless it simply arrogated to itself such
authority. Federal and state courts do have authority to re-
view tribal court civil judgments once the judgment winner ap-
pears in those courts to enforce the judgment, allowing for the
necessary review of tribal court jurisdiction and public poli-
cy. 171 However, most Supreme Court cases in the area appear
168. E.g., CONST. OF THE LITILE RIVER BAND OF OTTAWA INDIANS art. I, § 2.
169. CONST. OF THE LITTLE TRAVERSE BAY BANDS OF ODAWA INDIANS art. IV, §
B, available at http://www.narf.org/nill/Codes/1traverse/tl.pdf.
170. Cf. generally RAYMOND D. AUSTIN, NAVAJO COURTS AND NAVAJO COMMON
LAW: A TRADITION OF TRIBAL SELF-GOVERNANCE 34-35 (2009) (discussing the
Navajo Nation's territorial jurisdiction statute).
171. E.g., MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1065-67 (10th Cir.
2007); Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997); Teague v. Bad
River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 665 N.W.2d 899, 916-17
(Wis. 2003).
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to arise under the federal common law cause of action to dis-
cern tribal court jurisdiction. 172
The Supreme Court's decision in National Farmers estab-
lished the federal common law cause of action at issue. 173
There, the federal district court held that it had "acqui[red] ju-
risdiction . .. by way of federal common law" to enjoin a tribal
court plaintiff from seeking to enforce a tribal court default
judgment issued against the insurance company. 174
The Ninth Circuit reversed 2-1 on grounds that no federal
common law cause of action existed. 175 The majority opinion
asserted that Congress, in enacting the Indian Civil Rights Act
("ICRA") with its habeas provision, intended to exclude a fed-
eral common law cause of action for persons challenging tribal
court jurisdiction:
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe ... came to the federal
courts by way of a petition for habeas corpus. . . . Congress,
when it enacted the ICRA, purposefully restricted federal
court interference with the proceedings of tribal courts to
review on[ly] petitions for habeas corpus. . . . In asking that
we recognize a civil cause of action arising under federal
common law, National is requesting that we supplement a
remedy Congress intended to be exclusive, and that we do
so without statutory authority. 176
The dissenting judge asserted that tribal courts not subject
to federal court control or oversight might overreach, with their
authority "limited only by the presence of seizable assets with-
172. E.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 128 S.
Ct. 2709, 2716 (2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 357 (2001); Strate v. A-1
Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 444 (1997).
173. See Nat'1 Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
856-57 (1985).
174. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp. 213,
215, 218 (D. Mont. 1983), rev'd, 736 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845
(1985). It is interesting that the court issued equitable relief, not against the tri-
bal court or tribal court judge, but against the plaintiff. More recent cases in this
area involve an order directing the tribal court or judge as the defendant to dis-
miss a claim, cease proceedings, or decline to enforce a judgment. Cf. Strate, 520
U.S. 438 (tribal judge as defendant); Water Wheel Camp Recreational Area, Inc.
v. LaRance, No. CV-08-0474-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 3089216, at *13 (D. Ariz. Sept.
23, 2009) (tribal judge as defendant). Perhaps choice of defendant appears to be
irrelevant if the remedy sought is equitable.
175. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320,
1323 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
176. Id. (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 67-70 (1978)).
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in the reservation."1 77 The concern that tribal courts might
(and perhaps do) overreach without a supervising court to re-
strain them is, of course, the dominant concern of federal
judges when it comes to tribal court jurisdiction, especially over
nonmembers. 178
The majority opinion also cited Supreme Court precedent
involving an area of law-water regulation-that was an area
of federal common law until Congress enacted the Clean Water
Act in 1972.179 In Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Court held that it
would not apply higher water pollution standards than those
mandated by Congress in the Act on grounds that federal
common law had been preempted. 8 0 The Court wrote that the
adoption of federal common law was unusual to say the least,
and especially disfavored where Congress had legislated in the
field:
When Congress has not spoken to a particular issue, how-
ever, and when there exists a "significant conflict between
some federal policy or interest and the use of state law," the
Court has found it necessary, in a "few and restricted" in-
stances, to develop federal common law. Nothing in this
process suggests that courts are better suited to develop na-
tional policy in areas governed by federal common law than
they are in other areas, or that the usual and important
concerns of an appropriate division of functions between the
Congress and the federal judiciary are inapplicable. We
have always recognized that federal common law is "subject
to the paramount authority of Congress." It is resorted to
"[i]n absence of an applicable Act of Congress," and because
the Court is compelled to consider federal questions "which
cannot be answered from federal statutes alone[.]" Federal
common law is a "necessary expedient," and when Congress
addresses a question previously governed by a decision
rested on federal common law the need for such an unusual
exercise of lawmaking by federal courts disappears. 181
The Court did cite to an older Indian law case, where it
wrote, "Congress has not specifically provided for the present
contingency.. .. It has left such . .. details to judicial implica-
177. Nat? Farmers, 736 F.2d at 1325-26 (Wright, J., dissenting).
178. E.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 128 S.
Ct. 2709, 2724 (2009); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 383 (2001) (Souter, J., con-
curring).
179. See Nat? Farmers, 736 F.2d at 1325-26 (Wright, J., dissenting).
180. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981).
181. Id. at 313-14 (citations and footnotes omitted).
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tions."1 82 This dictum set the stage for the Supreme Court's
decision in National Farmers.
National Farmers dramatically expanded the notion of fed-
eral common law in the Indian law context, holding in a simple
syllogism that whether tribal courts have jurisdiction over
nonmember civil defendants in a given case is a question aris-
ing under federal law, and therefore section 1331 of the Judi-
cial Code authorizes federal courts to give an answer. 183 The
Court had a long history of adopting federal common law caus-
es of action in Indian law, but, in each instance, Congress had
created a right without any specified remedy. For example,
Congress had prohibited sales of Indian lands to anyone absent
the consent of Congress, but did not create a cause of action in
federal court to void such sales, and so the Supreme Court
created one. 184 Similarly, when the United States sued a coun-
ty on behalf of an Indian tribe for interest in back taxes illegal-
ly collected by the county, the Court applied federal common
law to determine whether such interest was recoverable. 185 In
none of these prior circumstances had the Court created a fed-
eral common law cause of action from scratch, by articulating a
common law right and a federal court remedy.186
Ironically, in rejecting claims by the nonmember petition-
ers that exhaustion of tribal court remedies is unnecessary, the
Court made the case for why no federal common law cause of
action should exist:
If we were to apply the Oliphant rule here, it is plain that
any exhaustion requirement would be completely foreclosed
because federal courts would always be the only forums for
civil actions against non-Indians. For several reasons, how-
ever, the reasoning of Oliphant does not apply to this case.
First, although Congress' decision to extend the criminal ju-
risdiction of the federal courts to offenses committed by non-
182. Bd. of Comm'rs of Jackson County v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349
(1939).
183. See Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845,
857 (1985).
184. See Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 470 U.S. 226,
237-39 (1985). The Court cited to numerous other instances where the Court as-
sumed that a federal common law cause of action existed allowing suit to recover
Indian lands. See id. at 235-36 (collecting cases).
185. See Bd. of Comm'rs of Jackson County, 308 U.S. at 349.
186. Even in the classic Supreme Court case creating a federal common law
cause of action, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971), the Court recognized the cause of action to enforce
federal constitutional rights against federal officials.
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Indians against Indians within Indian country supported
the holding in Oliphant, there is no comparable legislation
granting the federal courts jurisdiction over civil disputes
between Indians and non-Indians that arise on an Indian
reservation. Moreover, the opinion of one Attorney General
on which we relied in Oliphant, specifically noted the differ-
ence between civil and criminal jurisdiction. Speaking of
civil jurisdiction, Attorney General Cushing wrote:
"But there is no provision of treaty, and no statute,
which takes away from the Choctaws jurisdiction of a
case like this, a question of property strictly internal to
the Choctaw nation; nor is there any written law which
confers jurisdiction of such a case in any court of the
United States.
"The conclusion seems to me irresistible, not that such
questions are justiciable nowhere, but that they remain
subject to the local jurisdiction of the Choctaws.
"Now, it is admitted on all hands ... that Congress has
'paramount right' to legislate in regard to this question,
in all its relations. It has legislated, in so far as it saw
fit, by taking jurisdiction in criminal matters, and omit-
ting to take jurisdiction in civil matters. . . . By all
possible rules of construction the inference is clear that
jurisdiction is left to the Choctaws themselves of civil
controversies arising strictly within the Choctaw Na-
tion."187
In other words, the Court in National Farmers somewhat
casually assumed that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
challenges to tribal court jurisdiction over nonmembers, de-
spite an Attorney General opinion explicitly rejecting such a
conclusion-an Attorney General opinion the Court itself had
relied upon in Oliphant.18 8
187. Nat? Farmers, 471 U.S. 854-55 (quoting 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 175, 179-81
(1855)) (emphasis added; Court's emphasis omitted).
188. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 199 (1978) (citing
7 Op. Atty. Gen. 174 (1855)).
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National Farmers appears to be an example of what one
distinguished commentator describes as "pure federal common
law."1 89 "Pure" federal common law exists where the Supreme
Court identifies a right as a matter of federal common law and
then identifies a cause of action under federal common law. 190
The Court's simple syllogism in National Farmers has not been
followed by the Court in recent years, where the Court has re-
jected federal court jurisdiction over asserted federal causes of
action. It has held, for example, that it "will create pure feder-
al common law only when the issue at hand is uniquely federal
and the application of state law would create a significant con-
flict with an identifiable federal policy or interest."1 91
The holding in National Farmers is water under the
bridge, although parts of it are subject to rigorous scholarly
criticism, 192 and it is possible that the tribal court exhaustion
doctrine will be distinguished out of existence by the Supreme
Court.193 For now, the common law cause of action allowing
federal courts to accept challenges by nonmembers to tribal
court civil jurisdiction appears to be bedrock law.
Or is it?
There are really two kinds of cases in which nonmembers
challenge the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts over them. The
first kind is where the tribal court has issued a judgment and
perhaps a money award against the nonmember defendant,
and the plaintiff seeks to enforce the award in federal court.
One recent important case is Wilson v. Marchington,194 where
the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce a tribal court judgment
awarding $246,100 against a nonmember tortfeasor. 195 This is
a perfectly legitimate form of federal jurisdiction, regardless of
whether one agrees with the result. Courts have every right to
189. Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1667, 1716 (2008).
190. See id. at 1716-21.
191. Id. at 1717-18 (citing Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh,
547 U.S. 677 (2006)).
192. E.g., Robert N. Clinton, Comity & Colonialism: The Federal Courts' Fru-
stration of Tribale>Federal Cooperation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 30-34 (2004); Frank
Pommersheim, "Our Federalism" in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal
Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal Courts' Teaching and Scholarly Community,
71 U. COLO. L. REV. 123, 174 (2000) ("Without much concern for this issue, federal
courts have routinely, if not blithely, assumed jurisdiction to review tribal court
jurisdiction without any constitutional or statutory mandate to do so.").
193. See, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 449-53 (1997) (noting
that the tribal court exhaustion doctrine may be excused in some circumstances).
194. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998).
195. See id. at 813.
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determine whether to enforce foreign judgments, and this Pa-
per does not challenge that authority.
The second kind of federal jurisdiction is by far the more
common case, where the nonmember has lost a tribal court
judgment (or merely has been sued in tribal court) and seeks
injunctive relief from the federal court declaring that no tribal
court jurisdiction exists and an order forcing the tribal court
from either continuing with the case or preventing it from en-
forcing the judgment. In fact, all of the Supreme Court cases
addressing tribal court civil jurisdiction over nonmembers are
this kind of case. Strate v. A-1 Contractors,196 the first Su-
preme Court case passing explicit judgment on tribal court ju-
risdiction, reached the federal courts after the tribal court of
appeals held that it had jurisdiction over the nonmember de-
fendants on an action for a declaratory judgment and before
any tribal court judgment on the merits had been reached.197
Nevada v. Hicks' 98 similarly reached the federal courts on Ne-
vada's claim for declaratory relief after the tribal court of ap-
peals held it had jurisdiction but before a judgment on the me-
rits had been reached. 199 The most recent Supreme Court case
passing judgment on tribal court jurisdiction, Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land and Cattle Co., 200 involved the
same claim by the nonmember defendant, though in that case
the tribal court had reached a money judgment against the de-
fendant. 201
This second kind of case is the sort authorized by National
Farmers' establishment of a pure federal common law cause of
action-something the Supreme Court simply doesn't do any-
more in any other context. 202 National Farmers is an outlier in
that the Court would have been unlikely to adopt such a com-
mon law rule and remedy in any other context besides Indian
law.
Here is where tribal resistance can and must flourish.
There are at least three means of resisting federal court super-
vision of tribal courts as established in National Farmers. The
first line of resistance is to refuse recognition of the legitimacy
of federal court jurisdiction over National Farmers suits. Re-
196. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
197. See id. at 447.
198. 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
199. See id. at 357.
200. 128 S. Ct. 2709 (2008).
201. See id. at 2716.
202. See Mulligan, supra note 189, at 1721-26 (offering examples).
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sistance here is legally easy (though not politically, perhaps)-
tribal courts and tribal judges sued in federal court for declara-
tory and injunctive relief simply need not appear. 203 Of course,
this is what the State of Georgia did in the Cherokee Cases-
refuse to appear. They lost on the merits, but won on the polit-
ical stage, forcing the Cherokee Trail of Tears.204 Georgia is no
perfect analogy, given that the state government there was a
bad actor, trying to take Indian lands and protect its interest in
slavery by resisting the federal government. 205 But there are
lessons to learn from that story.
The second means of resistance is for the tribal parties in
interest to litigate aggressively against the National Farmers
precedent, relying upon the more recent Supreme Court cases
disfavoring pure federal common law actions. There are risks,
to be sure, for the lawyers making these claims, but they are
likely minimal.206 Perhaps, somehow, a federal circuit will be
persuaded that the foundations of National Farmers' federal
common law cause of action are no longer viable and hold that
there is no federal court jurisdiction to entertain challenges to
tribal court civil jurisdiction absent an Act of Congress. 207
An additional mode of resistance (noted in the introduction
to this Paper) involves a refusal to comply with a federal court
order. 208 As one of my colleagues at Michigan State Law
203. Over the decades since National Farmers, there seems to have been con-
fusion as to who the proper defendant in the federal case should be. In National
Farmers, the defendant was the Crow Tribe. Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v.
Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 845 (1985). In more recent cases, the defen-
dant typically is the tribal court or the tribal judge in his or her official capacity.
E.g., Elliott v. White Mountain Apache Tribal Court, 566 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir.
2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 624 (2009); BNSF Ry. v. Ray, 297 Fed. App'x. 675,
2008 WL 4710778 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2008). In some cases, bafflingly, the tribal
court judge herself appears to defend tribal court jurisdiction. E.g., Acosta-Vigil v.
Delorme-Gaines, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1194 (D.N.M. 2009); Azure v. Turtle Mountain
Tribal Court, No. 4:08-cv-095, 2009 WL 113597 (D.N.D. Jan. 15, 2009).
204. See 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 729-71 (rev. ed. 1926).
205. See id.
206. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Ethics of Pushing the Envelope
in Indian Law Cases, MSU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07-01 (Feb. 20,
2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1346938 (surveying cases and finding
that many Indian law-related arguments are protected efforts to impose law
reform).
207. Cf. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60-70 (1978) (holding
that no implied cause of action exists to enforce the civil provisions of the Indian
Civil Rights Act).
208. Cf. EDUARDO MOISES PERALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY
OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF
OWNERSHIP 61 (2010) (discussing how "local courts simply ignored the high
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School kindly informed me, any tribal court judge refusing to
comply with a court order should expect to be introduced to a
cell at Leavenworth. That may be true, especially considering
the federal judiciary's embrace of the "Courts of the conqueror"
mantle.209
But the federal courts' efforts (assuming they go this route)
call into direct question the authority of an Article III judge to
issue a contempt citation against the judiciary of the third so-
vereign without express authorization from Congress, and
where the cited party is not a party to the Constitution. Recall
that classic consent theory demonstrates that government au-
thority absent the consent of the governed, which can be me-
morialized and perhaps even established by legislation or con-
stitutional provision, is government by violence.210
Resistance in this vein requires an examination of the
practical consequences to the parties (assuming the tribal
judge avoids a federal prison cell). Likely, after a tribal court
continues to proceed in a civil action with a nonmember defen-
dant despite a contrary federal court ruling, one would expect
the defendant simply not to appear. This is an all-too-frequent
occurrence in Indian country courts, despite National Farmers'
warning to exhaust tribal court remedies before accessing the
federal courts to complain about tribal jurisdiction. These cas-
es typically end in a default judgment, often unenforceable by
the tribal court due to the lack of assets housed in the court's
jurisdiction. One might think that such resistance, culminat-
ing in an unenforceable default judgment, is useless.
However, it might not be. Over a decade ago, the St. Regis
Mohawk tribal court issued a default judgment against Har-
rah's, which simply had refused to appear before a tribal
court.2 11 The tribal court, as it must, proceeded to analyze the
court's ruling [in Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823)] and continued to
enforce . . . popular state law.").
209. E.g., Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 280 (1955) (quot-
ing Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 588 (1823)); United States v. Alcea Band of
Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 58 (1946).
210. Cf. Cover, supra note 141, at 1617 ("Legal interpretation must be capable
of transforming itself into action; it must be capable of overcoming inhibitions
against violence in order to generate its requisite deeds; it must be capable of
massing a sufficient degree of violence to deter reprisal and revenge."); H.
JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF
JUDICIAL DECISION 15 (2008) (discussing the U.S. constitutional system's appar-
ent allowance of a "judicial oligarachy" in the form of the Supreme Court).
211. See Arquette v. Park Place Entm't Corp., No. 00CIO133 (St. Regis Mo-
hawk Tribal Ct. Mar. 20, 2001). This case is excerpted in chapter 12 of my forth-
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merits of the claims against Harrah's, largely based on an al-
leged interference with a gaming development contract. Be-
cause Harrah's did not defend, the court accepted the reasona-
ble theory of liability and damages for the contract interference
and awarded a multi-billion dollar judgment against Harrah's.
Harrah's counsel likely believed that a tribal court judgment in
that amount was preposterous and vigorously defended efforts
by the plaintiffs to enforce the judgment in state and federal
courts. 212 But Harrah's moment of defiance cost the company
dearly. It carried the multi-billion dollar judgment in its SEC
EDGAR filings 213 for years while the enforcement actions pro-
ceeded in various courts. 214 The value of the company took a
serious hit during a time when it was for sale-a real-world
consequence of the tribal court judgment (later held unenforce-
able for various reasons).2 15
In less dramatic financial circumstances, tribal courts have
imposed civil fines and enforced civil forfeiture laws against
nonmembers who allegedly harvested illegal tribal timber,216
brought guns and drugs onto Indian trust lands,2 17 and com-
mitted civil traffic offenses. 218 Nonmembers faced with these
citations routinely pay them, sometimes to avoid the hassle of
carrying a civil court judgment against them, and sometimes to
avoid possible federal prosecution. Finally, it is becoming rou-
tine for state courts to enforce tribal court judgments in non-
controversial cases. 219
coming casebook, MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBAL LAW
(forthcoming 2012).
212. See Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm't Corp., 547 F.3d 115 (2d Cir.
2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1908 (2009); Vacco v. Harrah's Operating Co., 661 F.
Supp. 2d 186 (N.D.N.Y. 2009).
213. The U.S. Security and Exchange Commission posts all required filings of
corporate financial information on its EDGAR database online. See
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml.
214. Harrah's Entm't, Inc., Current Report, (Form 8-K) Exhibit. 99.1, at 21
(Mar. 25, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
858339/000119312508064598/0001193125-08-064598-index.htm.
215. E.g., Ryan Nakashima & William Kates, A Tribe, a Casino, a $2.8B Head-
ache: Deal by its Predecessor May Hurt Harrah's Buyout, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Oct. 28, 2007, at Bl.
216. See Moore v. Nelson, 270 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2001).
217. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir.
2007).
218. See SKOKOMISH TRIBAL CODE, tit. 8, available at http://www.narf.org/
nill/Codes/skocode/8-64.pdf.
219. E.g., Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter. v. Yau, No. 11789/2009 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct., Feb. 17, 2010), available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2010/
02/mashantucket-pequot-v-yau.pdf.
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Each example above is a case of tribal resistance to federal
law. Does speeding on tribal roads constitute activity that
meets the difficult burden of the Montana case? Well, if a
nonmember tortfeasor that negligently kills tribal members is
not subject to tribal jurisdiction, then probably not. The same
might even be true for a drug-running nonmember or a non-
member carrying concealed firearms. And so tribal assertions
of jurisdiction over these nonmembers are bold steps generat-
ing serious consequences. If nothing else, through lack of use
or success, the federal common law cause of action created in
National Farmers could become a dead letter. 220 At some
point, the Court's pronouncements on tribal court jurisdiction
will become largely irrelevant.
B. A Reboot of the Federal Common Law of Tribal Court
Jurisdiction
An additional strategic means of resistance is through a
careful litigation strategy to force certain fact patterns before
the federal judiciary with the goal of securing a Supreme Court
decision accepting tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. It
likely will take only one Supreme Court case to establish tribal
civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, but the strategy to generate
that one case involves thoughtful tribal government resistance
to federal courts. 221
Unlike criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Su-
preme Court (and Congress) has grudgingly left open the ques-
tion of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers. 222 Amici sup-
porting the non-Indian petitioner in Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land & Cattle Co. invited the Supreme Court to
eliminate the possibility that tribes could ever assert civil ju-
risdiction over nonmembers. 223 Each new tribal court jurisdic-
220. Cf. generally Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability of American Law to
Indian Nations, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1595 (2004).
221. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Rebooting Indian Law in the Supreme Court,
55 S.D. L. REV. 510 (2010).
222. It is important to note the distinction between tribal criminal jurisdiction,
which covers both tribal members and nonmember Indians, and tribal civil juris-
diction, which covers tribal members only. Compare, e.g., United States v. Lara,
541 U.S. 193 (2004) (nonmember Indians), and United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S.
313 (1978) (tribal members), with, e.g., Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997) (referencing "nonmembers" in this context), and Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981) (same).
223. See Brief of Mountain States Legal Found. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 2, Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S.
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tion case reaching the Supreme Court is another opportunity
for the Court to end all possibility of tribal court jurisdiction.
But it is also an opportunity for tribal interests to succeed,
assuming the right vehicle reaches the Court. Efforts by tribal
law enforcement to enforce civil offenses and civil forfeiture on
trust lands, and especially at a tribal business enterprise,
might suffice. Some tribes, such as the Pokagon Band of Pota-
watomi Indians224 and the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 225 have
begun to enforce civil offense ordinances against non-Indians
coming onto the reservation for business purposes. In essence,
the non-Indians cited have committed criminal acts, and the
tribal government proceeds with asserting civil jurisdiction
consistent with the Supreme Court's rulings. The enforcement
of tribal civil offenses against non-Indian perpetrators can be
said to be the only conceivable remedy for the tribe, because
state law enforcement has no jurisdiction and federal law en-
forcement is not guaranteed, given the disproportionate levels
of federal prosecution declinations. 226 Upon review under Na-
tional Farmers, a federal court would then presumably apply
the federal common law rules limiting tribal civil jurisdiction
over nonmembers. Any court would be hard-pressed to rule
against a tribe in favor of a non-Indian criminal perpetrator in
circumstances where the non-Indian is free to commit misde-
meanors without any chance of federal or state prosecution. At
Muscogee, the non-Indian brought guns and drugs to the casi-
no.227 At Pokagon, a non-Indian brought a gun inside the casi-
no and accidentally discharged it.228 The only remedy availa-
Ct. 2709 (2008) (No. 07-411) ("MSLF and its members believe that the only proper
forum in which to litigate legal disputes between tribal members and non-
members is State and federal courts, which apply law to all citizens, tribal mem-
bers and non-members alike, in accordance with the federal and State constitu-
tions and pursuant to well-established, documented, and verifiable law and proce-
dure.").
224. See POKAGON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS CODE OF OFFENSES § 1(B)
(2008). See also NOTTAWASEPPI HURON BAND OF POTAWATOMI INDIANS CIVIL
INFRACTIONS CODE (2009).
225. See Miner Elec., Inc. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 505 F.3d 1007, 1008
(10th Cir. 2007).
226. See Examining Federal Declinations to Prosecute Crimes in Indian Coun-
try: Hearing Before the Comm. on Indian Affairs, 110th Cong. 42-45 (2009)
(Statement of M. Brent Leonhard, Deputy Att'y Gen., Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation).
227. See Miner Elec., 505 F.3d at 1008.
228. Pokagon Band Tribal Court, Fee Account Funds Received and Expended
Report Log (Feb. 26, 2010) (noting that Raymond Harris was charged with carry-
ing a concealed weapon onto tribal lands on June 11, 2009).
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ble in these cases (not just a select few the federal government
can prosecute) is a tribal civil fine. All of the factors point to-
ward recognizing tribal jurisdiction to enforce the civil fine in
tribal courts and in other courts as well.
If the Court rejects the above analysis, it will be elevating
the interests of worse and worse non-Indian actors over those
of Indian people. In Montana and Brendale, the Court saw in-
nocent non-Indian property owners challenging tribal regulato-
ry authority.229 In Bourland, the Court saw innocent non-
Indian hunters.230 In Strate, the Court saw a negligent non-
Indian tortfeasor.231 In Atkinson Trading, the Court saw a
non-Indian business accepting a windfall in Navajo public ser-
vices without paying taxes. 232 In Plains Commerce, the Court
saw a non-Indian bank that refused to fulfill a promise to
supply capital to an Indian rancher during a brutal winter,
culminating in the death of the rancher's entire herd. 233 If the
next case is a violent, intoxicated, drug-running or gun-
smuggling non-Indian who has avoided federal and state prose-
cution, how can the Court still refuse to recognize tribal juris-
diction?
IV. TOWARD CONSENT AND RESISTANCE
The lack of valid consent has not prevented the United
States from imposing plenary, exclusive, and at times absolute
governmental authority over Indian tribes and Indian people.
As consent theory suggests, without valid consent there is ty-
ranny. 234 Federal-tribal relations throughout much of Ameri-
can history are marked with the characteristics of tyranny.
Congress and the President-with the Supreme Court's passive
compliance-undermined Indian tribal governance, alienated
the vast majority of Indian land and assets for the benefit of
229. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981); Brendale v. Con-
federated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 417-19
(1989).
230. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 685 (1993).
231. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1997).
232. See Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 647-48 (2001).
233. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct.
2709, 2715-16 (2008).
234. See JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, EXTENT
AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT paras. 199-210 (1690), reprinted in SOCIAL
CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME, AND ROuSSEAU 1, 116-22 (Ernest Barker
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1962) (1947).
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non-Indian Americans, and reduced Indian people to a shell of
their former cultural existence. 235
The federal government utilized the flawed consent of tri-
bal governments to enact laws and regulations that devastated
individual Indian people and tribal political communities. In
the past few decades, as Congress and the executive branch
have turned toward Indian self-determination, many of the
abuses have ceased or abated. 236 But some critical elements of
tyranny remain. Congress jealously guards its plenary power
over Indian affairs but also asserts power over internal Indian
governance, with executive branch compliance. Worse, the Su-
preme Court asserts a form of judicial dominance over a wide
variety of Indian affairs-including jurisdiction questions and
states' authority over Indian tribes-and sets the metes and
bounds of tribal authority. As the policymaking branches of
the federal government slowly vacate the field of Indian affairs,
the Supreme Court has stepped in as the primary policymaker,
an unusual role for the judiciary. 237
Now the Supreme Court takes affirmative steps to under-
cut tribal government authority, even as Congress and the ex-
ecutive branch begin to recognize and encourage tribal gover-
nance. For example, the Supreme Court has severely undercut
the ability of Indian tribes and the executive branch to restore
Indian property by adopting crabbed interpretations of statuto-
ry tools provided by Congress. 238 As Justice Scalia wrote to
Justice Brennan in a private memorandum written two dec-
ades ago, the Court audaciously decides Indian cases in accor-
dance with the way the law "ought to be" as opposed to the way
the law is.239
Under this American power structure, it is too late to re-
turn much of the lost Indian property to their rightful heirs,
and to return much of the destroyed Indian culture to its for-
235. See WILCOMB E. WASHBURN, RED MAN'S LAND / WHITE MAN'S LAw: A
STUDY OF THE PAST AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1971).
236. See Fletcher, supra note 15, at 130-54.
237. See generally Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Fed-
eral Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 460 (2005) ("Concerns about the excep-
tionalism of Indian law have even led some Justices to suggest that the Court, not
Congress, should have the final say about some matters.").
238. See Carcieri v. Salazar, 129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009). For an early critique of
Carcieri, see G. William Rice, The Indian Reorganization Act, The Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and a Proposed Carcieri "Fix": Updating the
Trust Land Acquisition Process, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 575, 592-608 (2009).
239. See Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier, supra note 30, at 1575
(quoting Justice Scalia).
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mer place, but it is not too late to restore and validate tribal
governance. The restoration of tribal governance is the first
step in restoring Indian property and reviving tribal cultures.
In the past, Congress and the President stood in the way, but
now the Supreme Court itself is the major barrier. And yet, as
the "least dangerous branch,"240 the Supreme Court is the less-
er long-term threat to tribal interests.
Indian nations must act on the reality that the Supreme
Court's federal common law decisions are out of step with Con-
gress, the executive branch, and the law of tribes themselves.
Indian nations must selectively resist the federal judiciary's as-
sertion of authority and jurisdiction and the Supreme Court's
pronouncements of national Indian affairs policy. Continued
tribal resistance in the subject areas discussed within this Pa-
per must be careful, reasonable, and strategic. Justice Bren-
nan's dissent in a key American Indian religious freedom case,
which worried that the Supreme Court's holdings on whether
federal government action substantially burdens Indian reli-
gions actually would encourage Indian people to engage in
criminal activity in order to protect religious practices, informs
this thesis to some extent.24 1 But resistance need not involve
criminal activity. Resistance can and should be lawful
American history is replete with individual citizen resis-
tance to government control. In fact, individual American re-
sisters jump-started the American Revolution by objecting to
English taxation and military prerogatives. American aboli-
tionist citizens resisted southern states during pre-Civil War
times, 242 and then Americans famously opposed the govern-
ments of the Jim Crow South in the 1950s and 1960s. 243 Amer-
icans have resisted the draft. 244 But Americans have also re-
fused to pay federal taxes or recognize government law
240. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (Yale Univ. Press 1986).
241. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988);
Kristen A. Carpenter, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Colo. Law Sch., Address at
the University of Colorado Law Review Symposium: "The Next Great Generation
of American Indian Law Judges" (Jan. 29, 2010). Consider also that the parties
most successful in challenging prosecutions under the Eagle Act are non-Indians
arrested for illegally taking eagles.
242. See DWIGHT LOWELL DUMOND, ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL WAR
IN THE UNITED STATES (1959).
243. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004).
244. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: 1492-
PRESENT 75, 78, 187, 409 (rev. and updated ed. 1995).
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enforcement authority-movements often spearheaded (and
perhaps sullied) by white supremacists and survivalists: 245 in
other words, unreasonable people. 246 Moreover, the State of
Georgia refused to appear in the Cherokee cases, asserting that
state sovereignty foreclosed federal court jurisdiction over it.247
In the decades leading up to the Civil War, many southern
states engaged in efforts to nullify federal law, either by enact-
ing legislation competing with Congressional acts or by refus-
ing to comply with federal court orders. 248 After the Civil War,
the southern states were so successful in resisting the Recon-
struction Amendments that the resulting federal civil rights
statutes remained unenforced for nearly a century after the
end of the Civil War.249 But states have something that Indian
tribes do not: explicit constitutional protection, express lan-
guage strongly preserving state sovereign authority, and a fed-
eral judiciary very respectful of states' rights. State resistance
to federal control is protected, so long as it does not (as a gener-
al matter) significantly interfere with national interests.
States have a direct line to the national government. 250
Critical to this argument is historical Indian tribal and in-
dividual Indian resistance to government control. Given the
absence of constitutional protections, it can be said without
much exaggeration that without Indian resistance, there would
be no Indian law and policy at all. Frankly, there would be no
245. E.g., S. Poverty Law Ctr., Intelligence Report: Movement at Root of Recent
Police Murders Growing (Aug. 12, 2010), available at http://www.splcenter.org/
get-informed/news/intelligence-report-movement-at-root-of-recent-police-murders-
growing-rapidly.
246. See Angela P. Harris, Vultures in Eagles' Clothing: Conspiracy and Racial
Fantasy in Populist Legal Thought, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 312 (2005).
247. See 1 WARREN, supra note 204, at 745 (discussing Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831)), and 754 (discussing Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)).
248. American Indian law is famous for such state resistance to federal law.
E.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443
U.S. 658, 672-74 (1979) (noting that state supreme court had ordered state agen-
cies not to comply with federal court orders); TIM ALAN GARRISON, THE LEGAL
IDEOLOGY OF REMOVAL: THE SOUTHERN JUDICIARY AND THE SOVEREIGNTY OF
NATIVE AMERICAN NATIONS 119-24 (2002) (describing how the State of Georgia
executed a Cherokee Indian, George Tassel, after the United States Supreme
Court had granted leave for Tassel to appeal and stayed the execution in Georgia
v. Tassel, 1 Dud. 229 (Ga. 1830)).
249. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 248-50 (3d ed. 2006).
250. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-54
(1985) (detailing the advantages states enjoy in the federal constitutional struc-
ture).
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Indians. From the framing of the Constitution until probably
1934, American Indian law and policy assumed that Indians
would "vanish."251 American Indian resistance prevented the
assumption from becoming reality. The modern examples of
resistance leading to legitimate and significant change in the
American Indian law context are fishing rights, smokeshops,
and gaming. 252 In those instances, Indian people resisted state
government discriminatory behavior and facially discriminato-
ry laws. Such resistance is reasonable in the context of the
consent theory propounded here.
Indian tribal consent to American governance may be im-
possible to generate; individual Indian consent may be similar-
ly impossible to generate. However, building upon Pitkin's
conception of consent theory by allowing for some form of resis-
tance, there is hope for legitimizing much of the structure of
American Indian affairs.
Resistance is the foundation of Indian tribal existence to
this day. 253 Indian tribes have resisted the United States from
the beginning, and their resistance has taken every conceivable
form. Indians and tribes have responded to their adversaries
by establishing constitutional forms of governments, 254 by
fighting wars, 255 by engaging in (mostly) nonviolent disobe-
dience during the fishing wars,256 by exploiting their immunity
to state regulation and taxation,257 by taking control of state
251. See Lerner, supra note 127, at 203; see also BRIAN W. DIPPIE, THE
VANISHING AMERICAN: WHITE ATTITUDES & U.S. INDIAN POLICY (1982).
252. See generally WILKINSON, supra note 20, at 150-73 (discussing fishing
rights), 329-51 (discussing gaming); Robert B. Porter, Building a New Longhouse:
The Case for Government Reform within the Six Nations of the Haudenosaunee, 46
BUFF. L. REV. 805, 897 (1998).
253. See generally Robert Odawi Porter, Tribal Disobedience, 11 TEX. J. C.L. &
C.R. 137, 156-62 (2006).
254. See generally DAVID E. WILKINS, DOCUMENTS OF NATIVE AMERICAN
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: 1500S TO 1933 (2009).
255. See JENNINGS C. WISE, THE RED MAN IN THE NEW WORLD DRAMA 96-299
(Vine Deloria, Jr. ed. 1971).
256. See VINE DELORIA, JR., INDIANS OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST: FROM THE
COMING OF THE WHITE MAN TO THE PRESENT DAY 145-76 (1977); ROBERT
DOHERTY, DISPUTED WATERS: NATIVE AMERICANS & THE GREAT LAKES FISHERY
(1990).
257. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (resisting state regu-
lation); In re Kan. Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866) (resisting state taxation);
Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968) (resisting state
regulation of hunting and fishing rights).
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highways on Indian lands, 258 by establishing progressive non-
adversarial dispute resolution systems,259 and so on. Paradoxi-
cally, given the Supreme Court's current self-adopted role, the
Court once served as an important, but limited, counterpoint to
the policymaking branches' assertion of plenary control.
Tribes remain under the "protection" of the United States
and strive to observe and protect treaty and statutory rights
and duties, while at the same time developing into modern
American governments under the Self-Determination Era of
federal policy.260 Tribes are now able to resist the worst of con-
gressional and executive branch law and policy by participating
in the federal political process, utilizing lobbyists and regulato-
ry experts to shape federal Indian policy as co-partners in the
process.261
Tribes also now have the capacity to engage in strategic lit-
igation to further discreet goals. However, unlike the law- and
policy-making process, tribal interests are systematically
thwarted in this arena. The Supreme Court appears to erect
case-specific common law barriers to tribal claims as they
arise, 262 generating confusion in an area of law that had been
moving toward a semblance of stability in the 1980s. The
Court's ad hoc approach to deciding Indian cases has begun to
severely undermine the advances Indian tribes and policymak-
ing branches of the federal government have made in progress-
ing toward establishing Indian tribes in their rightful place as
the third sovereign.
Resistance accomplishes at least two goals. First, it gives
teeth and practical legitimacy to the consent theory proposed
258. See Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peace-
making: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition Destroys Indigenous Societies,
28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 235, 290 (1997).
259. See JUSTICE AS HEALING: INDIGENOUS WAYS 345-407 (Wanda D. McCas-
lin ed., 2005).
260. See DEAN HOWARD SMITH, MODERN TRIBAL DEVELOPMENT: PATHS TO
SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND CULTURAL INTEGRITY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 33-37 (2000).
261. See Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn E. Rand, The 'Tribal Loophole"- Fed-
eral Campaign Finance Law and Tribal Political Participation after Jack Abra-
mo/f, 10 GAMING L. REV. 230, 234 (2006); see also Michael D. Oeser, Tribal Citizen
Participation in State and National Politics: Welcome Wagon or Trojan Horse?, 36
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 793, 797, 808, 809, 835 (2010) (describing tribal lobbying).
262. E.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (re-
writing Indian law preemption doctrine so as to deny its applicability in facts pre-
sented); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y., 544 U.S. 197 (2005)
(creating laches doctrine that applies only to Indian claims).
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here. 263 Ironically, resistance will help to vest Indian tribes in
the American constitutional structure by providing Indian tri-
bes a productive voice in the government. Tribes already have
a voice, some would argue, by hiring powerful and well-
connected lobbyists and influential Supreme Court litigators,
but that is the same voice that any non-sovereign interest can
purchase. Indian tribes are more than merely corporations or
special interests, and if they are to be vested in the American
constitutional structure, they must have the active ability to
resist in a manner that a recognized sovereign entity should be
able to pursue.
Second, resistance may actually undo some of the damage
done by the Supreme Court in recent decades. Much of the
Court's recent Indian law jurisprudence is built upon cases
arising in areas where the Court would have no jurisdiction but
for its own decisions, and involves application of federal com-
mon law that flies directly in the face of prevailing federal In-
dian policy. 264 Additionally, resistance to the Court's orders
may force the Court to fundamentally reexamine its own juris-
diction to issue those orders.
A possible analogy here would be to Mark Tushnet's theory
of "weak-form judicial review." 265 According to Tushnet, the
American constitutional structure allows for a "strong-form" of
judicial review, where the constitutional decisions of the Su-
preme Court are not reversible through ordinary legislative
processes. 266 "Weak-form" judicial review allows for major con-
stitutional decisions to be overridden through simple legislative
enactments, something not available in the United States.
Tushnet argues, however, that the Court already recognizes
"weak-form" judicial review within the American "strong-form"
structure-in the " 'area of economics and social welfare.' "267
There are good reasons for the Court to follow a similar course
263. Cf. PE&IALVER & KATYAL, supra note 208, at 169-226 (arguing that legal
responses to property rights resisters can generate more clarity and fairness in
property law).
264. E.g., Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S. Ct.
2709 (2008).
265. See Mark Tushnet, Weak-Form Judicial Review and "Core" Civil Liberties,
41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2006); see also MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS,
STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL WELFARE RIGHTS IN
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23 (2008) (defining "weak form systems of
judicial review").
266. See TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS, supra note 265, at 33-34,
37.
267. Id. at 37 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
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in federal Indian law by giving deference to Congress and the
executive branch in Indian affairs. There is no special institu-
tional capacity within the Supreme Court to make policy or to
reject the trends in Congressional policy in Indian affairs.
Ironically, that is exactly what the Court used to do in Indian
affairs, treating many, many cases as "political questions" in
deferring (almost criminally) to Acts of Congress which abro-
gated Indian rights in the nineteenth and twentieth centu-
ries. 268
Asserting that Indian nations never consented to federal
government supervision and therefore can claim a blanket ex-
emption from federal control is not a new argument, and it is
very likely a disingenuous one now that federally recognized
tribes have so much invested in the dynamic federalism-style
structure that dominates federal Indian law involving states,
localities, and the federal government. 269 This Paper does not
argue in favor of a blanket exemption and does not argue in fa-
vor of a careless disregard for federal control, 270 just as it does
not argue in favor of reasserting wholesale tribal criminal ju-
risdiction over non-Indians-something many Indian nations
themselves are not necessarily ready to handle. 271 As Amartya
Sen recently noted, it is worth theorizing a system of justice at-
tainable from the current state of affairs. 272 The theory of con-
sent propounded here is useless without a corresponding theory
of resistance, a theory of resistance that results in a form of le-
gitimate tribal investiture into the American constitutional pol-
ity. Successful tribal resistance forces a response. In the kind
of resistance contemplated in this Paper, successful tribal re-
sistance may persuade the Supreme Court to reconsider its
own precedents and defer to tribal court judgments and
268. E.g. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). See also Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of Indian Tribes, 82
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 153, 178 n.131 (2008) (collecting cases).
269. For a survey of tribal-state agreements, and how to negotiate one (from a
non-tribal perspective), see CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 620-60 (4th ed. 2008). See also COHEN'S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 6.05, at 589-94 (Nell Jessup Newton et al.
eds. 2005).
270. See LOCKE, supra note 234, at para. 243 (142-43) (noting that once "con-
sent" has been given validly, it cannot be withdrawn easily).
271. Cf. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Addressing the Epidemic of Domestic Violence
in Indian Country by Restoring Tribal Sovereignty, 3:1 ADVANCE 31, 39 (2009) (re-
commending Congressional restoration of tribal criminal justice authority over
non-Indians in a piecemeal fashion).
272. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 8-12 (2009).
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processes, something the Court itself said it would do in Na-
tional Farmers: "Exhaustion of tribal court remedies, moreover,
will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise
basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other
courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the
event of judicial review." 273 Tribal courts have met the first
part of this agreement, 274 and maybe it will take tribal resis-
tance to persuade the Court to meet its self-imposed obligation.
Tribal resistance to the federal government is only the first
step. A second and equally important step involves the recog-
nition of individual Indians to resist their own tribal govern-
ments in the same manner. Tribal resistance rings hollow if
the tribal government that presses the resistance refuses to
recognize the right of its citizens to resist, as many tribal gov-
ernments do in the form of tribal sovereign immunity and other
legal and political mechanisms. And, in many Indian commun-
ities, the pressure to resist the federal government must come
from individual Indians, as the tribal governments may have
too much of a stake in its relationship with the federal govern-
ment to resist successfully.275
273. Nat'1 Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) (cit-
ing North Dakota ex rel. Wefald v. Kelly, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6059 (Standing Rock
Sioux Tribal Ct. 1983) and Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. Buum, 10 Indian L. Rep.
6031 (Intertribal Ct. App. 1983)).
274. See William C. Canby, Jr., Commentary: Treatment of Tribal Court Con-
victions, 17 FED. SENT'G. REP. 220, 220 (2005) ("Tribal courts have made great
strides in recent years."). Cf. Catherine T. Struve, How Bad Law Made a Hard
Case Easy: Nevada v. Hicks and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts,
5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 288, 303 (2003) (noting that the same critiques of tribal
courts have been made of state courts, and "state courts are presumed to be com-
petent to hear cases arising under federal law").
275. There are two main problems in individual American Indian consent to
American government that will be addressed in my later work. The first is
whether Indian tribes have consented, either literally in the form of a treaty, or
implicitly through history and practice, to American governance. The problem
here is that Indian treaty-making typically was far from consensual. At a base-
line, the United States recognized that Indian tribes had sufficient sovereignty to
qualify as an entity eligible for treaty-making but used coercion, duress, fraud,
and multiple other tools to force Indian tribes into most of these oft-
unconscionable treaties. Non-treaty tribes were in an even worse position, typi-
cally having to exist in an underground status until modern federal recognition
elevated the lucky ones to a level akin to treaty-tribes. Indian treaties tied Indian
tribes to the United States in ways analogous to a form of physical, political, and
economic bondage not unlike apartheid.
The second problem of Indian consent involves the relationship between
Indian tribes and individual Indians. Traditional American Indian governance
was not centralized, meaning that no individual or small group of individuals go-
verned the Indian tribe (which itself is a misnomer). Indian leaders typically go-
verned by literal consent, not theoretical consent. Indian leaders had no more au-
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CONCLUSION
Let us return to the hypothetical that drives this Paper-
whether federal courts truly have valid, constitutional authori-
ty to order a tribal judge to dismiss a civil contract or tort claim
against a nonmember. It is the hope of the author that this
Paper establishes the uncertainty of the proposition that feder-
al courts can boss around tribal courts absent express congres-
sional authority. Tribal judges, in carefully chosen instances,
can and should resist such federal court decrees by simply re-
fusing to comply.
Likely due to the perceived radicalness of such a sugges-
tion, tribal resistance to federal court jurisdiction over tribal
court authority is long overdue. Under a long-settled principle
of federal Indian law, Indian nations retain all aspects of na-
tional sovereignty except those that affirmatively have been di-
vested by consent, by Congress, or by the Supreme Court. As
Congress has never affirmatively acted to divest Indian nations
of civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, 276 one would expect that
tribes retain such authority. But despite significant congres-
sional and executive branch support for tribal justice sys-
tems,277 the Supreme Court has repeatedly intervened on be-
half of non-Indian civil defendants and held that tribal courts
do not have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims against them.
This result is an oddity under any conception of the federal
judicial power since no Act of Congress granted the Court such
authority, and nothing in the Constitution requires such au-
thority. Tribal resistance to this authority is justified under
this regime.
thority than their own ability to persuade Indian people to follow them at any giv-
en time. Additionally, in the post-treaty era, the United States established, ter-
minated, and re-established Indian tribal governments again and again, with
rarely even a semblance of consent. As such, it could be said that individual In-
dians have not consented to their own government, let alone the American gov-
ernment.
276. See Nat'l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855, n.17.
277. See Janet Reno, A Federal Commitment to Tribal Justice Systems, 79
JUDICATURE 113 (1995); see also Mary Clare Jalonick, Justice to Boost Effort to
Combat Tribal Crime, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 20, 2009, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/wireStory?id=8370374.
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